Southern Illinois University Carbondale

OpenSIUC
Dissertations

Theses and Dissertations

12-1-2015

MACROECONOMIC ASPECTS OF
CONFLICT
Eric Daniel Lenz
Southern Illinois University Carbondale, lenz.eric@siu.edu

Follow this and additional works at: http://opensiuc.lib.siu.edu/dissertations
Recommended Citation
Lenz, Eric Daniel, "MACROECONOMIC ASPECTS OF CONFLICT" (2015). Dissertations. Paper 1115.

This Open Access Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Theses and Dissertations at OpenSIUC. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Dissertations by an authorized administrator of OpenSIUC. For more information, please contact opensiuc@lib.siu.edu.

MACROECONOMIC ASPECTS OF CONFLICT

by
Eric Daniel Lenz
A.S., Joliet Junior College, 2003
B.A., University of Illinois Champaign-Urbana, 2005
M.S., Southern Illinois University, 2013

A Dissertation
Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the
Doctor of Philosophy Degree

Department of Economics
in the Graduate School
Southern Illinois University Carbondale
December 2015

DISSERTATION APPROVAL
MACROECONOMIC ASPECTS OF CONFLICT

By
Eric Daniel Lenz

A Dissertation Submitted in Partial
Fulfillment of the Requirements
for the Degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
in the field of Economics

Approved by:
Dr. Zsolt Becsi, Chair
Dr. Stephen Bloom
Dr. Scott Gilbert
Dr. AKM Mahbub Morshed
Dr. Kevin Sylwester

Graduate School
Southern Illinois University Carbondale
August 7, 2015

AN ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION OF
ERIC DANIEL LENZ, for the Doctor of Philosophy degree in ECONOMICS, presented
on August 7, 2015, at Southern Illinois University Carbondale.
TITLE: MACROECONOMIC ASPECTS OF CONFLICT
MAJOR PROFESSOR: Dr. Zsolt Becsi

In the following papers I propose to construct economic models that incorporate
the disastrous effect of conﬂict. I model conﬂict theoretically in a Solow growth model
and empirically in a GDP per worker growth model, in a civil war onset model and a
model for civil war’s severity.
The ﬁrst chapter theoretically and empirically analyzes economic growth with
conﬂict in the context of the Mankiw et al. (1992) adaptation of the Solow growth model
and the natural resource growth model by Sachs and Warner (1995). I incorporate a
variable of capital destruction in the physical and human capital accumulation equations
and derive coherent theoretical and empirical results.

The second chapter considers the onset of civil war across all countries and
speciﬁc subsamples of countries from 1970 to 2007. The onset of war is modeled using
economic and ﬁnancial variables in addition to grievance variables from the political
science literature to ascertain the extent to which ﬁnancial crises and hyperinﬂation can
bring about civil war. I estimate using panel time-series logistic regression techniques
and discover the risk of conﬂict in Africa, Asia, highly-indebted poor countries, and low
income countries. Some civil wars are fought for government control and others are
fought over local issues - both types of war are controlled for with their own
determinants.
i

The third chapter determines factors that signiﬁcantly affect the severity of civil
wars from year to year. I employ the same IV/GMM estimation techniques from Chapter
1 to discover the role of ﬁnancial crises, hyperinﬂation, unemployment, and
development assistance and aid in the severity of war.
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1
CHAPTER 1
CAN CONFLICT DIMINISH GROWTH?

1.1.

Introduction
Does conﬂict diminish growth? Literature in growth and development is silent on

the matter. However, it seems self-evident that conﬂict can lower GDP per capita by
lowering capital and labor. Conﬂict’s disastrous effects are highlighted by experiences in
select countries:
For instance, in Figure 1 the Rwandan civil war began in 1990 and culminated in
the genocide of as many as 800,000 people in 1994, but the economy did recover and
GDP per worker rose to its antebellum level almost a decade later. In Figure 2, the
ongoing Mexican drug war began in 2006 and resulted in at least 60,000 casualties, but
the Mexican economy is still recovering. The recent conﬂict in Ukraine, though the death
toll is small, is a drain on the country’s resources which could be used to aid an already
struggling economy. However, unlike the ﬁrst two examples, the lasting effects of
conﬂict on Ukraine’s economy are still unknown. How will this conﬂict affect the
productivity of the common working person in the short and long-run? We investigate
precisely this effect.
Growth regressions do not typically include these destructive effects of war1. One
exception is the work by Polachek and Sevastianova (2010) which investigates GDP
per worker growth averages using independent variables of population growth, a central

1

Barro (1989)
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government’s balanced budget, trade openness, investment, and interstate and
intrastate conﬂict variables. The regressions are based on Sachs and Warner (1995)
which augments standard Barro (1989) regressions to focus on the effect of natural
resources.
Another way of doing growth empirics follows the approach by Mankiw et al.
(1992). The Solow growth model is built on a production function of capital and labor to
measure levels of gross domestic product. Mankiw et al. (1992) introduce human capital
to the Solow model and ﬁnd that human capital growth explains a great deal more of
GDP variation than physical capital growth. It is from this approach that we measure
how much conﬂict affects GDP per worker.
Beyond the empirical work in Polachek and Sevastianova (2010), very little
empirical economic research into conﬂict exists. There are many different theories of
conﬂict which are modeled in the context of game theory, but as Murdoch and Sandler
(2002) write in their survey of empirical work related to civil war, there is a need for
more “quantitative analysis to distinguish between theories”. The problem is that there
exists little theory of the effect of conﬂict on growth, as conﬂict theory usually looks at
determinants of conﬂict2.
To look at the relationship of conﬂict and growth we construct growth models
similar to Polachek and Sevastianova (2010) and Mankiw et al. (1992) and introduce
civil war and interstate war over short and long periods. The ﬁrst group estimation is
panel time-series in a generalized method of moments and instrumental variables

2

For instance, Collier and Hoeffler (2004), Fearon and Laitin (2003), Lacina (2006) and
Elbadawi (1999) determine the onset and severity of civil war.
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framework, an expansion of more general empirical methods in Polachek and
Sevastianova (2010). In the second estimation, we model GDP per worker with shares
of investment, population growth, and conﬂict based on Mankiw et al. (1992). The ﬁrst
estimation is done as a point of comparison to estimation in ordinary least squares from
Polachek and Sevastianova (2010) and to determine which type of conﬂict, interstate or
intrastate, has a short and long-run effect. The second estimation determines how
important conﬂict is in determining a worker’s typical standard of living.
The results from the ﬁrst group estimation indicate that interstate war, aggression
across borders, causes a 0.56 percent decrease in GDP per worker per year of conﬂict
over a 20-year average. This means that a country that has experienced 5 consecutive
years of interstate conﬂict will have an annual growth rate that is 2.8 percentage points
less growth than a country that is peaceful. This result must be considered in the
context of an average growth rate that is between 1 and 2 percent. Separating the data
by region we notice that Asian and Southeast Asian countries face slightly smaller
declines in GDP due to civil war. Also, supporting the current conﬂict literature, conﬂict
is relegated to low and middle-income countries.
The ﬁrst group estimation is based on the speciﬁcation of Polachek and
Sevastianova (2010) and is preceded by the theory behind Sachs and Warner (1995),
an explanation of the data and conﬂict variables, and empirical estimation methods. The
results are reported by region and income and then ﬁnally as a whole. The second
group estimation follows with an analysis of Mankiw et al. (1992) and a GDP levels
estimation with conﬂict. The relationship between low income countries and conﬂict is
addressed and followed by theory based on the Solow model of growth. Then the paper
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concludes with data, methods and results for this second group estimation.
1.2

Literature review
Two mainstays in the economic conﬂict literature, Skaperdas and Garﬁnkel, draw

on knowledge of game theory with applications to conﬂict; however, newer research
empirically analyses the negative economic impact of conflict. Blomberg and Hess
(2002) considered 152 countries from 1950-1992 and found that economic recessions
generally promote internal and external conﬂict. They also concluded that the state of
the economy and conﬂict are dependent on one another.
Sevastianova (2009) found a strong relationship between levels of GDP and
conﬂict, but cautioned against using conﬂict with GDP growth. She explains that war
may actually increase GDP with regards to international war. Polachek and
Sevastianova (2010) ﬁnd that both inter- and intra-state conﬂict reduce GDP growth,
and severity matters more than duration of conﬂict. We will see that severity is indeed a
better measure of conﬂict’s deleterious eﬀect, but the effect seldom appears to
substantially increase GDP per worker.
Blattman and Miguel (2010) remind us of the need for better data and a more
micro-oriented analysis of conﬂict. My analysis involves a macroeconomic perspective
on conﬂict, but still achieves coherent and signiﬁcant conclusions. Their case of
analyzing conﬂict on the micro-level is further bolstered by the small effects of conﬂict
on growth we will see country by country. We know conﬂict has damaging effects, its
analysis may require more speciﬁc data on a micro-level. Another recent article from
Nakamura et al. (2013) considers the implications of conﬂict on asset prices.
Nakamura’s research does not use conﬂict data from the Correlates of War or the
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Uppsala Conﬂict Database which may further bolster any empirical take on conﬂict.
Murdoch and Sandler (2002) test a neoclassical growth model with civil war and
the ensuing spillover effects on neighboring countries. They ﬁnd results similar to
Polachek and Sevastianova (2010) in which civil war has a strong short-run effect, but
with collateral damage. They attribute spillover effects to reduced efficiency of
resources such as a country spending more on military instead of other productive
activities. Long-term effects of civil war are described as occurring as a result of
destruction to human capital and forgoing investment. Murdoch and Sandler (2002) also
echo the sentiments of Blattman and Miguel (2010) in the need for more “quantitative
analysis to distinguish between theories”.
Since the dataset includes data from foreign aid recipients we should make
mention of the relationship between aid and conﬂict. Chauvet (2003) concludes that
violent instability has a positive effect on aid allocation and hence economic growth, but
social instability has a negative effect. This suggests that countries which are
experiencing conﬂict or war may actually receive more aid thus confusing the real
deleterious effects of war on capital and labor. We contend that negative effects can still
be seen in GDP growth rates despite the foreign aid inﬂuence.
The paper from which Polachek and Sevastianova (2010) base their estimation is
Sachs and Warner (1995) wherein countries with high levels of natural resources are
found not to experience high levels of economic growth. From this paper we use
variables of investment, government efficiency, initial per capita incomes, etc. Sachs
and Warner (1995) use long-run averages of GDP growth which are modiﬁed by
Polachek and Sevastianova (2010) to include 1-year, 2-year and 5-year averages. In
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this paper we consider a 10-year growth average as well. These growth regressions are
also in the spirit of Barro (1989). Barro (1989) ﬁnds inverse relationships between
growth and government consumption and initial levels of income. He also touches on
the role of human capital which we will discuss in the speciﬁcation by Mankiw et al.
(1992).
Robert Solow’s original growth model includes capital and labor while Mankiw et
al. (1992) add human capital to better explain GDP per worker growth across countries.
My second model stays true to Mankiw et al. (1992), though I add conﬂict to the capital
and human capital accumulation equations. This is explained in greater detail in the
following sections.
1.3

GDP per worker growth averages over different time periods via Polachek

and Sevastianova (2010)
Generalized method of moments and instrumental variables estimation are
based on Polachek and Sevastianova (2010) and Sachs and Warner (1995) who
consider average growth rates covering 1970 to 1990. The Sachs and Warner model of
1995:
(ln 𝑌1990 − ln 𝑌1971 )𝑖 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 ln 𝑌1970𝑖 + 𝛽2′ 𝑍𝑖 + 𝜖𝑖
Sachs and Warner (1995) use a base year of 1971 and ﬁnd the average growth
over 20 years. Polachek and Sevastianova (2010) take a more recent dataset and ﬁnd
variable growth rates. My empirical models are as follows and are analogous to the
speciﬁcation in Polachek and Sevastianova (2010) with the addition of a 10-year growth
average:
(ln 𝑌𝑖𝑡 − ln 𝑌𝑖𝑡−𝑗 )𝑖 = 𝛽 ln 𝑌0𝑖𝑡 + 𝜌𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝜑𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼𝑖 + 𝜃𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖
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𝑗 = 1, 2, 5, 10, 20
There is value added to these models by estimating with generalized method of
moments via Arellano & Bond and instrumental variables. This accomplishes a check to
the ordinary least squares regression techniques that Polachek and Sevastianova
(2010) and Sachs and Warner (1995) employ. Y is GDP per worker and Y lagged by j
years is GDP per worker from a previous period with a host of independent variables, X,
and conﬂict variables, C, with group and period speciﬁc ﬁxed effects. Sachs and Warner
estimate with only 90 observations, 1 average growth rate per country. I replicate these
results and then estimate a panel time-series in OLS and ﬁxed eﬀects.
1.4

Comprehensive data analysis for ﬁrst group estimation
The data for this project come from the Penn World Tables (version 7.1 and 8.0),

the Correlates of War database (version 4.0), the Sachs and Warner database (1997),
and the World Development Indicators from the World Bank (2014). The Penn World
Tables offer several deﬁnitions of gross domestic product, but to simplify estimation, I
use GDP per employed person using version 7.1. The employment variable from
version 8.0 has several missing values so I use the version 7.1 variable for better
estimation eﬃciency. Using this deﬁnition of GDP, I derive 1-year, 5-year, 10-year and
20-year growth averages which are similar to Polachek’s speciﬁcation from Polachek
and Sevastianova (2010).
From the Correlates of War database, I construct variables for war duration
measured as the cumulative number of years in which a country experiences conﬂict.
Polachek and Sevastianova (2010) uses a similar construction from the Correlates
database for the years 1970 to 2000. This domestic war variable will explain not the
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severity of war, but the cumulative effect of being engaged in conﬂict over one or many
years. The example in Table 1 with civil war describes how this duration variable is
accumulated.
The construction of the duration variable is to show the effect of cumulative
engagement in conﬂict. The mean of the civil war duration variable is 0.172 years, as
seen in Table 3, which tells us that any given country experiences about 2 months of
civil conﬂict per year on average and half a month of interstate conﬂict for the respective
interstate conﬂict duration variable.
To measure intensity of conﬂict, I take the variables of interstate and civil war
battle deaths from the Correlates of War database. For a given year, conﬂict deaths per
1,000 people is measured for both speciﬁcations. The data is not precise for number of
deaths occurring each year over time periods longer than 1 year. For example in Bosnia
& Herzegovina, in Table 2, the conﬂict over a period of three years resulted in 27,500
casualties. However, the database does not list casualties incurred during the ﬁrst year
versus the last year of conﬂict, i.e. there is no variation in severity over the length of the
civil war.
There are some inherent problems with this since the data collectors do not tally
precise estimates of war casualties. However, this will still give coherent results and a
general measure of conﬂict severity. This is one limitation of using a sizable dataset with
many groups and periods - precise annual estimates of conﬂict have not been recorded
for a duration longer than 1 year3.

This is true with the exception of ACLED (Armed Conﬂict Location & Event Data
Project).
3
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Some criticism arises in that we consider GDP per worker, instead of GDP per
capita. GDP per worker stays true to the original speciﬁcation by Sachs & Warner,
Polachek and Sevastianova (2010) and Mankiw et al. (1992). As a means of
comparability of research, keeping GDP per worker will prove valuable and is supported
by theory. Also, we mustn’t account for deaths to the very young or elderly since they
don’t signiﬁcantly contribute to GDP.
1.5

Stationarity vs. non-stationarity
There is still some dissension in explaining the stationarity of GDP. Nelson and

Plosser (1982) could not reject the null hypothesis of a unit root and cautioned against
the use of non-stationary monetary variables in explaining output variations. Aslanidis
and Fountas (2012) found that only a few countries exhibit real GDP which is stationary
and that the exchange rate regime has a role. Hegwood and Papell (2006) consider
structural change when modelling real GDP and conclude it is in fact trend stationary in
this context.
We may suspect non-stationarity in GDP per worker, but the test for a 10-year
growth rate also suggests a unit root. Therefore, in the estimation procedure I difference
the 10-year growth rates and achieve a desirable solution with signiﬁcant coefficients.
However, this solution actually yields a lower F-statistic and therefore suggests a poorer
ﬁt for GDP growth.
In Table 4, notice that the Maddala & Wu panel unit root test suggests unit roots
in log GDP per worker and the 10-year GDP per worker growth variable. This procedure
assumes cross-section independence of the dependent variable, but we may expect
GDP per worker to be relatable across borders. GDP per worker will tend to rise over

10
time in all countries, however, this does not suggest a dependent relationship between
countries.
The Pesaran panel unit root test assumes cross-section dependence, but for the
reason I just mentioned, we wouldn’t expect GDP growth rates to be related across
countries except for the fact that they share a general positive trend. In summary, I
maintain the undifferenced 10-year growth rates which provide a better explanatory
model.
1.6

Robustness checks
An important consideration is whether we should study only countries which have

experienced conﬂict or all countries as a whole. If we restrict the sample to only
countries that have felt the effects of conﬂict through simply 25 deaths occurring in a
year as a result of armed conﬂict, then the coefficients actually become smaller and less
signiﬁcant in the 1 and 2-year average regressions. In the 5-year and 10-year average
regressions the coefficients are actually a bit larger, yet still less signiﬁcant. The addition
of several countries that have 0 values for conﬂict increases the sample size and
therefore also the signiﬁcance of coefficients. For the purposes of this paper, all
countries are included in estimation unless otherwise speciﬁed.
Another issue is the exclusion of certain variables for which there are insufficient
observations. The measure of central government budget balance, government revenue
minus government expenditures, limits our sample to 140 countries with an average of
10.5 years of data per country. Excluding the variable includes 20 more countries in the
sample with an average of 38.5 years of data per country. The F-statistic also increases
from 42.01 to 52.74 in the 1-year average regressions using instrumental variables.
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Thus the ratio of explained variance to unexplained variance without the central
government budget balance is greater than with its inclusion and hence is a better
explanatory model for short-run variations in GDP per worker. In the long-run, the
generalized method of moments estimation ﬁts a better model with the central
government budget balance.
Multicollinearity may exist among the conﬂict variables as cumulative battle
deaths are composed of interstate and civil war fatalities. If explanatory variables are
related to each other than the coefficient estimates are unreliable and standard error
estimates are too high. However, this is not the case as the variance inﬂation factors for
civil war fatalities, interstate war fatalities and cumulative battle deaths are all below 5
which is the standard measure of degree for collinearity.
Another point of contention is the division of data into subsamples of income and
region. Polachek and Sevastianova (2010) check results by region, income level and
political regime while we only seek results by region and income. Some differences are
noticeable by region and income; however, the overall conclusions are that conﬂict is a
low and middle-income problem.
In Africa, from Tables 10 through 12, the duration of civil war and civil war
fatalities play signiﬁcant roles in growth. The strongest effects occur in the 10-year
growth averages with a decline in GDP of 0.238 percent per year of civil war. With a 20year average of 1.157 percent growth, this corresponds to signiﬁcant drops to the
average worker’s well-being as civil war rages on.
The European story is similar with signiﬁcant eﬀects of civil war fatalities. A 10year growth average is hindered by 0.935 percent for every 1,000 people that die in civil
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conﬂict. Europe does not have any significant trouble with engaging in civil war in so far
as no one dies and adversely affects the labor supply. High levels of human capital in
Europe play a role in this context as valuable workers are killed or displaced.
Civil war has remarkable effects over all time periods in Asian and East Asian
countries. In Tables 10 through 12, these countries exhibit signiﬁcant 1, 2, and 5-year
changes in growth of approximately 0.30 percent per year of civil war. Over the same
time periods, Southeast Asian countries show slight improvements in growth as portions
of their small labor force are replaced and the economy reorganizes. Interstate conﬂict
plays a long-run role in Asia, in Table 14, with signiﬁcant declines of 0.716 percent per
year over a 20-year period.
Engagement in civil war in South America contributes to percentage changes in
growth of roughly -0.5 percent per year of civil war over 2, 5, and 10-year periods in
Tables 11 through 13. Prolonged civil war is always disadvantageous, but more so if
civil conﬂicts do not resolve after 1 year. Weakening of Africa’s economy occurs in the
long-run at 10 and 20-year periods of growth. Engaging in civil war is costly to Africa in
ways similar to South America.
1.7

Instrumental variables and GMM estimation
What is generalized method of moments estimation? Many economists are

familiar with ordinary least squares estimation, but generalized method of moments
estimation and its special case of instrumental variables estimation are fairly new topics.
Generalized method of moments is a general estimation technique whereby estimators
are determined from moment conditions. These moments may be the sample mean or
variance and are used to estimate unknown parameters. We make assumptions about
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the distribution of the population, such as that it is normally distributed, and from this
assumption (and assumptions of the population mean and variance for example) we
generate the sample moment conditions.
The number of moment conditions we specify, however, may not necessarily
equal the number of parameters we wish to estimate and therefore we may not have
exact solutions. In this case, the number of moment conditions we specify may be
greater than the number of parameters we wish to ﬁnd. The objective is then to
minimize the diﬀerences between what we expect our parameters to be and the actual
population values. GMM is useful in applications for large samples, such as my own,
where the law of large numbers becomes beneﬁcial.
Typically the GMM estimation technique via Arellano and Bond (1991) assumes
limited to no serial correlation of the errors. The Wooldridge test for panel-data models
from Wooldridge (2001) conﬁrms no autocorrelation thus allowing the possibility of a
consistent estimator. Arellano and Bond (1991) estimation is also typical with large N
and small T (in my case, 59 groups and 10 years on average for 2-year, 5-year and 10year growth averages). A simple autoregressive speciﬁcation follows (from Arellano and
Bond (1991)):
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑦𝑖(𝑡−1) + 𝜂𝑖 + 𝑣𝑖𝑡
The Arellano & Bond GMM estimation is included as a point of comparison to the
instrumental variables, ﬁxed effects regression technique called xtivreg2. I include and
compare regression results from both speciﬁcations and only report the coefficients of
interest on the conﬂict variables. This is done for 1-year, 2-year, 5-year and 10-year
growth rates.
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The method of IV/GMM estimation labeled “xtivreg2” is similar to the Arellano &
Bond estimation technique. I chose to instrument the lag of GDP growth with lagged
consumption prices. We expect correlation with consumption prices and GDP growth,
but not necessarily with other variables. The improvement over estimation without
instruments is very small and endogeneity in general shouldn’t pose a signiﬁcant
problem. Xtivreg2 estimates ﬁxed-effects for panel time-series data and this estimation
technique differs significantly from Polachek and Sevastianova (2010) in which panel
ﬁxed-effects estimation with OLS was completed.
Ordinary least squares is performed on all models and these types of regressions
do not incorporate within-group variation of independent variables. This was a favored
technique twenty years ago in growth models when long-period averages were simply
calculated for each country in the sample. This method works perfectly ﬁne when each
country has one observation of interest, but panel time-series estimation may require us
to include inherent differences in each country. Therefore, we include ﬁxed eﬀects
estimation with group and period-speciﬁc eﬀects to capture the innate differences
among countries.
One question may be raised, “Why compare GMM estimation techniques with
typical IV estimation?” Generalized method of moments estimation can account for
arbitrary heteroscedasticity within groups - a problem which may arise in
implementation of instrumental variable estimation. We may suspect some correlation of
errors within groups, but using both techniques will be useful as a point of comparison.
There is a tradeoff in efficiency by choosing not to use OLS and we’re allowing for this
tradeoff. Also, we’re generally searching for some consistency with Polachek and
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Sevastianova (2010) and conﬂict variables should be able to withstand such a
comparison.
1.8

Results
In the regression analysis, some variables are omitted due to insigniﬁcance,

otherwise the regressions are analogous to the speciﬁcation in Polachek and
Sevastianova (2010). Some of these are variables like measures of polity, institutional
quality, and government consumption and other conﬂict variables such as militarized
disputes. The addition of militarized disputes is problematic as the estimations in
Polachek and Sevastianova (2010) excessively high changes in growth from these key
variables. The interpretation of MIDs is also not straightforward as the variable is a
discrete variable measuring the escalation of conﬂict.
The ﬁrst two columns in Table 5 report results from Sachs & Warner’s original
dataset and my new dataset with variables that may differ slightly from the original set.
Several of the key independent variables are actually averages over the time period of
1970 to 1990 and include 1 observation for each country. The second two columns
report coefficients for panel time-series estimation in ordinary least squares without
conﬂict and with conﬂict.
First, the results in Table 5 bear resemblance to the original. The 20-year growth
rates are explained by all four conﬂict variables signiﬁcantly. The addition of conﬂict
yields striking results for countries that engage in long-periods of interstate war - a
decline in GDP per worker of 0.56 percent over a period of 20-years for each year
engaged in aggression across borders. For each year of civil war, there is an associated
decline of 0.067 percent. Every 1,000 people killed by civil war result in loss to GDP of
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0.029 percent. Once again, the mean of the dependent variable in Table 3 is 1.157
percent.
Short-run estimation in Tables 6 and 7 yield negative coefficients on interstate
war fatalities per 1,000 people. The interpretation of these coeﬃcients is such that a 1unit increase in the conﬂict variable causes a percentage change in the dependent
variable that is equal to the coefficient. Therefore, consecutive years of interstate war
have a compounding effect on 1-year GDP growth rates. This is because if a country
experiences 3-years of uninterrupted across the border conﬂict, then the effect on GDP
growth can be 3-fold. A long-run interstate conﬂict can have lasting effects on annual
and biennial GDP taking a greater toll with each additional year.
Growth rates over longer periods of time show the effects of conﬂict quite clearly.
For the 5-year growth rates in Table 8, civil war duration and interstate fatalities play
leading roles. Civil war’s devastating eﬀects are greater than interstate war’s effects
over 5-years. For every year a country is involved in civil war, there is an associated
decline of about 0.144 percent in gross domestic product per worker.
Civil war and interstate war duration have roughly equal effects in the economy
over 10 year periods in Table 9. Interstate war fatalities still play a small role as the
labor supply is reduced. Overall, we cannot make a judgement on whether civil war or
interstate war is more damaging, but we do discover some overall trends. Civil war does
not affect GDP growth in the short run over 1 to 2-year periods. It is a 5 to 20-year
problem creating lasting effects in an economy. Interstate war has a small effect in the
short-run and large effect in the long-run. The 20-year growth rate average suffers the
most from prolonged periods of interstate war engagement.
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1.9

GDP levels estimation via Mankiw et al. (1992)
1.9.1 Introduction

Mankiw et al. (1992) propose an augmented model of Solow’s neoclassical production
function of capital and labor. The inclusion of human capital in the production function
provided more empirical evidence of the Solow theory which explains cross-country
variations in income per capita. This paper reaffirms Solow’s predictions by updating the
model with current data and ﬁxed-effects regression techniques. Then, the addition of
conﬂict into the model provides a framework for analyzing the share of destructive war
in determining the standard of living.
Research into conﬂict has often described conﬂict as a low-income country
problem. This is evident in the scatter diagram in Figure 3 of logged gross domestic
product per worker over the period 1960 to 2011 and civil war deaths per 1,000 people.
The severity of war is measured by the number of deaths and we see that extreme
examples of conﬂict typically occur in low-income countries. The Khmer Rouge in
Cambodia are responsible for close to 45,000 deaths and the Bosnian civil war of the
1990s accounts for almost 30,000 deaths. The U.S. was involved in civil war and
experienced casualties in Vietnam in the early 1960s before the Vietnam War, however,
these deaths measured in the hundreds.
There is a clear relationship between economic level of well-being and conﬂict,
but how much of this well-being is determined by destructive activity?
1.9.2 Theory
Mankiw et al. (1992) speciﬁcally address the Solow model of growth with the
addition of human capital. From this model I introduce conﬂict into the capital and
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human capital accumulation equations. The literature suggests such capital destruction
along with labor displacement, but I account for declines in labor through human capital.
The Mankiw et al. (1992) speciﬁcation is as follows:
𝛽
𝑌𝑡 = 𝐾𝑡𝛼 𝐻𝑡 (𝐴𝑡 𝐿𝑡 )(1−𝛼−𝛽)

The basic theoretical model deﬁnes Yt as GDP, Kt as capital, Lt as labor, Ht as
human capital, and At as the level of technology all at time t. This speciﬁcation differs
β

only from the Solow Model in that it includes Ht as a measure of human capital and
hence a β is subtracted from the At Lt exponent. The model I propose is identical in this
respect, yet through the accumulation of capital and human capital, conﬂict has a
disastrous eﬀect. The capital and human capital accumulation equations are:
𝐾̇𝑡 = 𝑠𝐾 𝑌𝑡 − 𝛿𝐾𝑡 − 𝑐𝐾𝑡
𝐻̇𝑡 = 𝑠𝐻 𝑌𝑡 − 𝛿𝐻𝑡 − 𝑐𝐻𝑡
Mankiw et al. (1992) hypothesize a rate of capital depreciation, δ, at 0.03 and g,
the growth of technology, at about 0.02. The depreciation of capital due to conﬂict is
somewhat more difficult to measure. There exists no real, accurate measure of the
declines in capital due to war. However, we will discover this does not pose a significant
problem. If we divide (1) by At Lt to get a measure of per worker GDP, capital and
human capital, then the production function becomes:
𝛽

𝑦𝑡 = 𝑘𝑡𝛼 ℎ𝑡

Solving for the change in capital and human capital over time we discover that
destruction of capital will play a role similar to population growth, technology growth,
and depreciation:
𝑘̇𝑡 = 𝑠𝐾 𝑦𝑡 − 𝑘𝑡 [𝜂 + 𝑔 + 𝛿 + 𝑐]
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ℎ̇𝑡 = 𝑠𝐻 𝑦𝑡 − ℎ𝑡 [𝜂 + 𝑔 + 𝛿 + 𝑐]
In steady-state, k̇ t = ḣ t = 0, and we ﬁnd expressions for physical capital and
human capital, k* and h* :
1−𝛽

𝛽

1−𝛼

𝛼

𝑠𝐾
𝑠𝐻
1−𝛼−𝛽
1−𝛼−𝛽
𝑘 =
𝜂+𝑔+𝛿+𝑐
𝜂+𝑔+𝛿+𝑐
∗

𝑠𝐻
𝑠𝐾
1−𝛼−𝛽
1−𝛼−𝛽
ℎ =
𝜂+𝑔+𝛿+𝑐
𝜂+𝑔+𝛿+𝑐
∗

Then solving for y* , the steady-state value of GDP per worker, as a function of
the right-hand side of equations (7) and (8):
𝛼

𝛽

𝑠𝐾
𝑠𝐻
1−𝛼−𝛽
1−𝛼−𝛽
𝑦∗ =
𝜂+𝑔+𝛿+𝑐
𝜂+𝑔+𝛿+𝑐
For the empirical speciﬁcation we must take natural logs of all variables and
separate the technology parameter from GDP per worker. The technology parameter is
determined by an initial level, A(0), and exogenous growth rate, gt , in At =A(0)egt . The
form of our empirical model:
𝑌𝑡
𝛼
𝛽
𝛼+𝛽
ln [ ] = ln 𝐴(0) + 𝑔𝑡 +
ln(𝑠𝐾 ) +
ln(𝑠𝐻 ) −
ln(𝜂 + 𝑔 + 𝛿 + 𝑐)
𝐿𝑡
1−𝛼−𝛽
1−𝛼−𝛽
1−𝛼−𝛽
The model in Mankiw et al. (1992) expresses human capital alternatively in levels
by combining (7) and (10). Income per worker is now expressed as a function of the rate
of investment, human capital, and the rate of population growth and capital destruction
due to conﬂict:
𝑌𝑡
𝛼
𝛽
𝛼
ln [ ] = ln 𝐴(0) + 𝑔𝑡 +
ln(𝑠𝐾 ) +
ln(ℎ∗ ) −
ln(𝜂 + 𝑔 + 𝛿 + 𝑐)
𝐿𝑡
1−𝛼
1−𝛼
1−𝛼

20
1.9.3 Data
The measure of human capital comes from Penn World Tables version 8.0 which
compiles years of schooling from Barro and Lee (2013) and returns to education from
Psacharopoulos (1993). The Barro and Lee (2013) dataset includes census and survey
observations from UNESCO, statistic agencies, and other sources for educational
attainment of individuals over 15 years of age. Psacharopoulos’ rate of return on
education takes into account beneﬁts and costs of education, i.e. earnings and foregone
earnings for attending school.
The population growth variable also comes from version 8.0 of Penn World
Tables and includes individuals of all ages, not only those of working age. This is a
deviation from Mankiw et al. (1992) due to the desire for longer periods of consistent
data and estimation efficiency. The regressions still yield similar results to Mankiw et al.
(1992) in light of this substitution.
The conﬂict variables are measures of duration and severity for both interstate
and intrastate conﬂict from the Correlates of War database versions 4.1 and 4.0
respectively. We may not take natural logs of this data due to the prevalence of many
values of 0 during a period of peace, therefore the interpretation of coefficients from the
regressions is not one of elasticity. A share of gross domestic product per worker is still
determined by these conﬂict variables and is discussed in more detail in the results
section.
Gross domestic product per worker is measured in 2005 constant prices from
Penn World Tables version 7.1. Version 8.0 includes separate variables for GDP and
employment, but the 7.1 version is used to avoid discrepancies and missing
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employment data. This variable corresponds to both dependent variable speciﬁcations
by Polachek and Sevastianova (2010) and Mankiw et al. (1992).
1.9.4 Results
The original model by Mankiw et al. (1992) consists of samples from OECD
countries, non-oil producing countries, and countries with populations less than 1 million
and having poor data. I’ve restricted my analysis to OECD, Non-oil producing and all
countries because poor data quality should not be the problem as the original paper
was published over 20 years ago. The estimation procedure is ordinary least squares
and the results are recorded in Table 18. The ﬁrst two columns are coefficients resulting
from Mankiw et al. (1992). The independent variables are average investment and
average population growth from 1960 to 1985. Solow theory predicts that coefficients for
investment and population growth are 0.50 and -0.50 and this is true for OECD
countries. The non-oil producing countries have larger coefficients than are otherwise
predicted - a problem resolved in Mankiw et al. (1992) with the addition of human
capital.
The Mankiw et al. (1992) results are included with updated data from 1960 to
2010 as a point of comparison. The Solow model does not seem to hold up with the
inclusion of new OECD countries and a longer time period and the non-oil countries
give us the same problem of inappropriately large coefficients. The support for the
Solow model improves in the panel time-series analysis in Table 19. Comparing OLS
and ﬁxed effects estimation results we notice smaller coefficients with higher
significance.
The inclusion of human capital allows for a better ﬁt of the data. Table 20 shows
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just how much human capital explains logged GDP per worker. Mankiw et al. (1992)
ﬁnd greater coefficients on human capital for OECD countries and Table 20 tells just the
opposite story. There are some new OECD countries included in the sample and human
capital may play less of a role than it did 30 years ago in determining GDP. Human
capital matters to non-oil producing countries with coefficients of 2.89 compared to 1.49
of OECD countries. The dependent variables, in Table 3, have means between 9 and
10. The interstate war variable, as suspected, does not affect OECD countries in Tables
20 and 21.
Conﬂict as previously noted is a low to middle-income country problem as
evidenced in Tables 15 though 18. Still in the ordinary least squares regressions we
don’t receive consistently significant coefficients. The ﬁxed eﬀect estimations in Table
21 are better suited for analysis in contrast to Table 20. The GDP of OECD countries is
well-explained through human capital and the coefficients are not inappropriately large.
All coefficients are of the correct sign and statistically signiﬁcant. The interstate conﬂict
variable for non-oil producing countries accounts for almost the exact same share of
GDP as the population growth rate. Therefore, in terms of explanatory power, conﬂict’s
destructive effects seem to account for the same decline in GDP as the population
growth rate.
1.10

Conclusion
The natural resource model from Sachs and Warner (1995) and the revision by

Polachek and Sevastianova (2010) provide an empirical base from which we analyze
conﬂict’s deleterious eﬀect on GDP growth per worker. Using GMM estimation
techniques we arrive at conclusions similar to Polachek and Sevastianova (2010), but
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with the distinct differences between interstate and civil war in the short and long-run.
Civil war has lasting effects in an economy, over 5 and 10 years, with no short-run effect
to the average worker’s standard of living. Interstate war has small effects in the shortrun, over 1 and 2-year periods, but larger effects over 20-year periods. The decline in
GDP per worker is as much as 0.56 percent per year of interstate conﬂict.
The inclusion of conﬂict in the Mankiw et al. (1992) augmented Solow model
proves insightful theoretically and empirically. The disastrous effect of conﬂict
represents as much of the share of GDP as Solow’s original population growth variable.
The Solow model is also better analyzed through ﬁxed effects panel time-series
estimation than ordinary least squares.
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Figure 1: Real GDP per worker in Rwanda 1960-2011

Figure 2: Real GDP per worker in Mexico 1960-2011
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Figure 3: Log GDP per worker and civil war deaths 1960-2011

Table 1: Civil war's duration

Table 2: Civil war's severity
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Table 3: Summary statistics

Table 4: Panel unit root tests
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Table 5: 20-year percent change in GDP per worker
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Table 6: 1-year percent changes in GDP per worker

Table 7: 2-year percent changes in GDP per worker
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Table 8: 5-year percent changes in GDP per worker

Table 9: 10-year percent changes in GDP per worker
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Table 10: 1-year percent changes by region

Table 11: 2-year percent changes by region
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Table 12: 5-year percent changes by region

Table 13: 10-year percent changes by region
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Table 14: 20-year percent changes by region

Table 15: Low income percent changes in GDP per worker

33
Table 16: Middle income percent changes in GDP per worker

Table 17: High income percent changes in GDP per worker
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Table 18: Original and current Mankiw regressions with average investment and
population growth

Table 19: OLS and fixed-effects regressions using panel time-series 1960-2011
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Table 20: OLS regressions with current OECD, non-oil, and all countries from
1960-2011 with and without conflict inclusive human capital

Table 21: Fixed-effects regressions with current OECD, non-oil, and all countries
from 1960-2011 with and without conflict inclusive human capital
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CHAPTER 2
FINANCIAL CRISES AND THE ONSET OF CIVIL WAR

2.1

Introduction
Financial crises have widespread eﬀects to governments and consumers in an

economy: consumer wealth declines, government budgets are drained to purchase
failing banks and assets, and business investment falls along with consumer
conﬁdence. Of the 128 of civil wars, in Tables 34 through 36, 25 systemic banking
crises have coincided with the onset of war or preceded it by 5 years. The prevalence of
civil wars was also highest in the 1990s and curiously conﬂict-affected countries also
faced more ﬁnancial crises during the same period on average.
Therefore, if there is a relationship between banking crises and civil war, perhaps
it is noticeable in the costliest banking crises since 1970: Indonesia in 1997 and GuineaBissau in 1995. From Figures 4 and 5, the costliest banking crises in terms of ﬁscal cost
and increases in debt concurrently experience or are superseded by civil war. This
suggests that conditions arising from a ﬁnancial crisis can spur people to rebel.
This paper addresses the role of ﬁnancial crises and the economy in relation to
civil war. We seek to determine whether a ﬁnancial crisis can spur a rebellion for
government control or cause ﬁghting with the government over local issues across an
international sample of countries with different levels of income from 1970 to 2007. This
issue is explained using background theory in conﬂict and empirical estimation using
panel time-series logit regression techniques.
Two models for the onset of civil war primarily explain rebel motivations:
grievance and opportunity. A model of grievance-based risk, such as in Fearon (2003),
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determines civil war’s risk through ethnic and religious differences, the level of
democracy which offers government representation of such diversity, and income
inequality. The economic opportunity model of civil war’s onset from Collier and Hoeffler
(2004) suggests rebel motivations are better explained by opportunity (greed) instead of
grievance. Economic variables such as GDP and primary commodity exports (including
oil and diamonds) predict the incentives for people to take up arms against their
government and other groups. A country with low GDP per person indicates greater
beneﬁts and lower opportunity costs to civil rebellion. An increase in primary commodity
exports correlates to an increase in rents to be collected by the government and
potential proﬁts in export markets – both cases make armed conﬂict more probable
(Collier and Hoeffler, 2004). This economic explanation is incomplete as other economic
events can lower the opportunity cost of conﬂict and increase the relative beneﬁts to
rebellion – namely a systemic banking crisis that lowers employment, consumer wealth,
and a government’s ability to provide services and infrastructure to grieved citizens.
We estimate opportunity and grievance models from Collier and Hoeffler (2004)
with base economic and political science variables but include measures of ﬁnance and
banking: deposit to GDP ratios, capital formation, hyperinﬂation, and a ﬁnancial crisis
dummy to capture the effect of financial instability and rising prices on civil war’s risk. A
systemic banking crisis signiﬁcantly predicts the onset of civil war thus providing
evidence that ﬁnance matters in civil war. In the subsample of Africa, a region with
heavy conﬂict in the 1990s, ﬁnancial crises predict the onset of civil war within 5 years.
The onset model for the Asian subsample predicts civil war within 2 years of a systemic
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banking crisis. Samples of low income and highly-indebted poor countries (HIPC) reveal
a greater risk of civil war developing from ﬁnancial crisis.
To understand the economic impetus for civil war, ﬁrst a summary of civil war
literature is needed. This ﬂows directly into a discussion of the variables: motivations
behind their inclusion, their size of inﬂuence, and the difference between “greed” and
“grievance”. Then models of opportunity (greed) and grievance are analyzed separately
and together including ﬁnancial crisis determinants. I follow this by estimating onset in
the subsamples of Africa, Asia, and highly-indebted poor countries. Then I distinguish
between two types of war: a war for government control and a war over local issues.
2.2

Why civil war and finance?
Civil war occurs more frequently than international war and has spillover effects

to neighboring countries (Hegre et al., 2011). Collier (1999) contends that civil wars can
be “more damaging than international wars” due to the locale of destruction. Given the
greater frequency and severity of civil war than international war and the prevalence of
ﬁnancial crises since the 1970s, the theory and estimation of civil war’s onset related to
financial markets seems worthy of examination.
Civil wars and ﬁnancial crises have much in common, for instance, they are both
contagious (Bordo and Murshid, 2000; Hausken and Plümper, 2002; Murdoch and
Sandler, 2002). Capital formation declines in both cases and capital ﬂight increases
(Davies, 2007; Greene, 2002). The onset of conﬂict and ﬁnancial crises is also related
to a weak, indebted government. Output losses are common in both cases as in Cerra
and Saxena (2008) wherein civil wars create larger declines in output, but are less
persistent than ﬁnancial crises. Government spending increases substantially in war
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and ﬁnancial crisis: to ﬁnance the war through military expenditure (Braun and
McGrattan, 1993) or to purchase failing ﬁnancial assets like non-performing loans from
banks (Valencia and Laeven, 2008). Both civil wars and ﬁnancial crises are aberrations
to a stable economy and government, but economic instability and government
inefficacy may also cause both. In any case, due to the similarity of determinants and
their contagious nature, crises and civil wars may in fact be related such that the
conditions arising from a ﬁnancial crisis create an environment conducive to civil war.
2.3

Literature review
2.3.1 Civil war’s onset
The research related to civil war risk began in the late 1990s (Collier, 1998;

Fearon, 1998) and early 2000s (Collier and Hoeffler, 2004;Fearon and Laitin, 2003),
shortly after the greatest amount of countries experienced civil war 4. The base
regression in Fearon and Laitin (2003) contains measures of gross national income,
population, percent of mountainous terrain, oil production, democracy, and others which
were modeled ﬁrst in Fearon and Laitin (2003). In Collier and Hoeffler (2004), similar
variables are included along with economic variables of GDP, GDP growth, and primary
commodity exports5.
Collier and Hoeffler (2004) explain civil war’s onset economically in terms of
opportunity cost alongside measures of ethnic and religious fractionalization,

4

See Tables 34 through 36

However, Fearon (2005), in contrast to Collier and Hoeffler (2004), ﬁnds that primary
commodity exports insigniﬁcantly explain the onset of civil war. Fearon explains that oil
exportation, which is correlated with primary commodity exports at r=0.46, is signiﬁcant
and this is the determining factor in civil war’s onset.
5
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democracy, and income inequality. Some differences between the opportunity model of
Collier and Hoeffler (2004) and the grievance-based model in Fearon and Laitin (2003)
are that Collier uses logged GDP per capita and GDP growth, instead of gross national
income per person. Collier and Hoffler (2004) also implement logged population in the
current year as opposed to Fearon’s 1-year lag of logged population. The reason for this
may be related to the complexity involved in determining the start and end dates of civil
war and the estimation in 1-year and 5-year groups discussed below.
There are two main datasets of civil war: the Correlates of War project and the
Uppsala/PRIO database. One difference between these conﬂict datasets is the date of
civil war onset6 and Collier and Hoeffler (2004) may account for this by recording the
onset if civil war began during a ﬁve-year time period. In contrast to the ﬁve-year
measure, this paper is concerned with yearly changes7 and takes advantage of the
Correlates of War database which is accurate to the start day of conﬂict. A yearly
estimation of civil war’s onset allows for more observations than 5-year average
estimations and therefore rigorous panel-time series regression techniques which
require many observations.

6
7

See discussion in section 2.5.1 Correlates of War and Uppsala/PRIO.

Other civil war onset analyses have considered yearly analyses, such as Fearon
(2005).
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2.3.2 Government’s role in civil war
This paper argues that systemic banking crises play a role in the onset of civil
war and therefore government spending and policy during a financial crisis8 must also
be important. Easterly (2001) positively connects political instability to government
consumption - ineffective governments consume more. Barro (1989) ﬁnds an inverse
relationship between growth and government consumption hence as economic activity
declines, the risk of civil war increases9 along with government consumption. Collier
(1999) adds to this sentiment and writes, “the government’s capacity to collect revenues
and provide essential services” is disrupted during war. Elbadawi (1999) explains that a
government involved in civil war is “less effective in dealing with poverty”. A government
in civil war spends more, yet collects less revenue from its tax base and is less effective
in providing wealth-improving services to its citizens.
In addition to the issue of government capacity to provide services, there is also
an issue with the perception of government policy changes. The policies of an indebted
government in civil war are less likely to be seen as credible by rebel forces (Elbadawi,
1999). Any government policy changes may be seen as simple appeasement to end a
conﬂict and not indicative of long-lasting change that rebels desire.
For a government involved in war, victory depends upon a taxable base that
increases government revenues and therefore military capacity (Elbadawi, 1999). This

8

For instance, government policy related to purchasing insolvent banks and nonperforming assets which are connected with the tradeoffs (opportunity costs) to
government-provided services and development.
9

This is explained through the economic theory of conflict using opportunity costs.
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government victory seems less probable when government debt increases by 86
percent on average in the three years after a banking crisis (Reinhart and Rogoff,
2009). Therefore, the years following a ﬁnancial crisis will be very important in terms of
government defense and maintaining stable economic growth.
Hess and Orphanides (2001) suggest that some government leaders of nondemocracies receive appropriative beneﬁts from a conﬂict while the costs are left to
their citizens. In summary, governments play a role in civil war through spending
decisions, policy changes, taxation, and perhaps even an opportunistic motive.
2.3.3 The relationship between war and finance
A connection between civil war risk and financial markets has yet to be made, but the
economy and ﬁnancial markets in particular are clearly affected by war through bond
markets, the accumulation of capital and its ﬂight from the conﬂict zone, and overall
consumption change as a result of conﬂict. Frey and Kucher (2001) ﬁnd that European
bond markets reacted to major events in World War II. After all, if a nation does not
exist, it cannot service its public debt. In this case of international war, “the outbreak of
the war depressed both bonds” (Frey and Kucher, 2001). However, during the war,
investors in government bonds based their decisions on the country’s probability of
victory and therefore the probability of repayment. A better investment decision may be
to send capital abroad out of troubled areas.
Davies (2007) explains that conﬂict causes a risky environment for investment
and induces capital ﬂight. During a widespread internal conﬂict, funds may be looted or
misappropriated thus motivating investors to look abroad “to a location where [funds]
cannot be traced or retrieved by lawmakers” (Davies, 2007). However, Davies
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acknowledges that there hasn’t been analysis of capital ﬂight before the onset of civil
war.
Rose and Blomberg (2010) consider the aftermath of terrorist attacks in the
economy and highlight the “immediate attention and support” needed to ﬁnancial
markets. Blattman and Miguel (2010) suggest that ﬁnancial analysis can be applied to
explain the recruitment for and organization of civil war. Blomberg and Hess (2012)
determine consumption growth in the presence of conﬂict and ﬁnd that individuals in
conﬂict-affected countries would trade 9 percent of their current consumption to live in
peace10. Blomberg and Hess (2012) highlight the value of tradeoffs that individuals
make in an economy that may or may not experience conﬂict.
One reason to make such a tradeoff is due to conﬂict which “lowers the discount
factor for valuing future welfare” by increasing the probability of death (Blomberg and
Hess, 2012; Blanchard, 1985). If people are more likely to die today, they are less likely
to place a high value on their future welfare. A ﬁnancial crisis may also lower expected
future welfare and make an individual more likely to join a rebellion.
Blomberg and Hess (2002) measure breakpoints of recession or expansion in the
economy and the probability of resulting internal and external conﬂicts. They encode
recessions and expansions with a 1 or 0 respectively and estimate the joint probabilities
of a country in a state of conﬂict or peace given a recession or expansion in the
previous period. This type of estimation is called a bivariate Markov process and

Blomberg and Hess (2012) model a business cycle via Day (1992) with conﬂict
disruptions to ﬁnd the lower bound on the cost of war.
10
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predicts the occurrence of one event given the occurrence of another event (or events)
in the previous period.
The limitations of Blomberg and Hess (2002) are in the consideration of only
GDP in a state of growth or decline. Other factors which may determine the onset of war
are not considered. Another consideration is that a systemic banking crisis may not
result in a decline in GDP and a recession may not be related to a ﬁnancial crisis.
However, on average a systemic banking crisis does result in declining economic
activity. The conﬂict-causing effects of a recession, often spurred by a ﬁnancial crisis11,
may understate the role of ﬁnance and banking in creating conditions for civil rebellion.
The ﬁnancial analyses so far explain the effect war has on finance, but what role
can ﬁnance play in the onset of civil war? Collier and Hoeffler (2004) explain economic
predictors for civil war: “dependence upon primary commodity exports, low average
income of the country, and slow growth”. Primary commodity exports, like oil, are
immobile, lootable, and heavily taxed thus ripe for rebel predation. Little economic
growth equates to fewer job and schooling opportunities and easier rebel recruitment.
Low GDP per person suggests lower opportunity costs to joining a rebel organization
and government military. However, Collier and Hoeffler (2004) explain “tax revenue
rises with income” and less government revenue “reduces the capacity of the
government to spend on defense, and so makes rebel predation easier”. A government
in debt due to ﬁnancial crisis is a weak government and more likely to face opposition
from rebel groups.

11

Since the 1990s, more than 70 percent of the total amount of recessions were related
to financial markets.
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2.4

The onset of civil war - a description of the main conflict variable
The measure for the onset of civil war is constructed from the Correlates of War

Intra-state Wars database version 4.112. The onset of war is defined as a dummy
variable, 0 or 1, which indicates the first year of civil war in a country. For example, the
Hukbalahap Rebellion began in 1950 in the Philippines and the 1 indicates the onset of
that war in Table 22.
In this case, there is no indication of the length of rebellion or the severity of
conflict. There is only a data point of “1” in 1950 to indicate something happened in
1950 to spur an uprising. This paper argues that the state of the economy, not only
political governance, has an important role to play.
The Intra-state war database records wars that take place “within the recognized
territory of a state” and “the war must involve sustained combat, involving organized
armed forces, resulting in a minimum of 1,000 battle-related combatant fatalities within a
twelve month period” (Sarkees and Wayman, 2010).
The scholars who originally developed the COW dataset, Melvin Small and J.
David Singer, also differentiate between genocide and rebellion. They establish
conditions such that both sides provide an effective degree of resistance. Three
different types of civil war are coded: state vs. non-state entity, regional subunit of state
vs. non-state, and intercommunal wars or non-state vs. non-state entities. Two types of
state vs. non-state war are further identified: war for central control or over local issues.

12

This data can be found at: http://cow.dss.ucdavis.edu/data-sets/COW-war.
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One example of civil war for central control is the Democratic Republic of Congo
in the late 70s and 90s. Civil war in the Darfur region of Sudan is an example of war
over local issues as the SLA and JEM do not wish for state control. The Cultural
Revolution in China in 1967 is an example of regional internal war. The Christian Tarok
and Muslim Fulani in Nigeria fighting amongst each other in 2004 is identified as an
intercommunal war. Civil wars in Africa are typically fought for government control, while
wars in Asia are fought with the government over local issues.
2.5

Alternative data specifications
2.5.1 Correlates of War13 and Uppsala/PRIO14
A rebel force does not typically announce the start of its insurrection nor does the

government vocalize the beginning of its counter-insurgency tactics. Therefore, there is
some discrepancy in the start dates of civil war between the updated Small and Singer
dataset from Sarkees, Reid and Wayman (2010) called the “Correlates of War” (COW)
and the Uppsala/PRIO dataset from Gleditsch et al. (2002). The reasons for choosing
the COW data are discussed in the Data section above: very accurate starting dates of
war and a strict deﬁnition of civil war. The Uppsala/PRIO dataset by comparison
specifies civil war slightly different. For instance, Northern Ireland is considered in a
state of conﬂict between 1971 and 1993 for the PRIO dataset, but the episode is absent

13

Sarkees, Meredith Reid and Frank Wayman (2010). Resort to War: 1816 - 2007.
Washington DC: CQ Press.
14

Gleditsch, Nils Petter, Peter Wallensteen, Mikael Eriksson, Margareta Sollenberg,
and H˚avard Strand (2002) Armed Conﬂict 1946-2001: A New Dataset. Journal of
Peace Research 39(5).
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in the Correlates of War. Thailand’s speciﬁcation of civil war lasts from 1970 to 1982 in
the PRIO dataset, but only from 1972 to 1973 in COW data.
To address this issue, I also include regression results with a speciﬁcation of civil
war’s onset from Uppsala/PRIO in Table 31. The model does not perform as well - there
is less signiﬁcance in the gross domestic product variables likely due to the longer
speciﬁcation of conﬂict periods by Uppsala/PRIO15. Also, the Correlates of War project
data has been used in Collier and Hoeﬄer (2004) and Fearon and Laitin (2003), two
sources from which this paper is inspired.
2.5.2 Penn World Tables and the World Development Indicators
Gross domestic product from the Penn World Tables have been used previously
in analyzing civil war and therefore a short comparison and explanation is warranted for
choosing the World Development Indicators from the World Bank. The Penn World
Tables generally have earlier GDP data going back to 1960 in developing countries like
Afghanistan, Ethiopia, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique, Somalia, and Uganda.
The World Development Indicators have more data for other countries like Sudan and
Sierra Leone in addition to more recent data up to 200716. The analysis of conﬂict with
ﬁnancial crises occurs mainly during and after the 1990s17, so I chose the World
Development Indicators (WDI) database.

15

Another issue is that the Uppsala/PRIO dataset considers combatant and noncombatant battle deaths as opposed to Small and Singer’s combatant battle deaths.
As a side note, economic, political and ﬁnancial data used in this paper are sourced
from Catini and Saade (2010) (http://sites.google.com/site/md4stata/).
16

17

From 1970 to 2007 there have been 375 years of systemic banking crises with 70
percent occurring after the Cold War.
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A choice was made not to combine the two datasets since the speciﬁcation of
GDP per capita, GDP growth, and population is diﬀerent in each dataset. This would
result in fairly large changes from one year to the next if missing data from WDI is
replaced with Penn data in the same country. Fearon and Laitin discovered this problem
in Fearon and Laitin (2003) and used techniques of data generation and interpolation to
derive gross national income:
“We used income growth rates from the World Development Indicators 2001 to
extend the estimates in the Penn World Tables 5.6 and then used the per capita
energy consumption estimates provided by the COW project to estimate
additional missing values.”
In using this method to generate and compile data, a question arises as to
whether the researchers are actually estimating the onset of conﬂict with a uniﬁed
measure of gross national income18. In order to avoid such a complication I estimate the
main regressions again using GDP per capita, GDP growth and population levels from
the Penn World Tables. From Table 32, the results are very similar for Africa and Asia
with WDI data, but the ﬁnancial crisis dummy and its lags are insigniﬁcant for the entire
sample. However, the severity of ﬁnancial crisis is still a signiﬁcant determinant of the
onset of civil war in all samples.

18

For a detailed explanation of data generation in Fearon and Laitin (2003), go to:
http://web.stanford.edu/group/ethnic/workingpapers/addtabs.pdf
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2.6

Economic predictors of conflict
2.6.1 Gross domestic product per capita

Gross domestic product per capita, along with GDP growth and population, come from
the World Development Indicators database from 2013. The log of current GDP per
capita measures consumer buying power and economic well-being of a country’s
citizens. The common explanation for including GDP per capita in a conﬂict model is
that it measures the opportunity cost of joining a rebellion. There is a tradeoﬀ to starting
a civil war and joining a rebellion - namely the lost wages and economic opportunities a
person gives up when they decide to ﬁght. When GDP per capita is low, the relative
beneﬁts to ﬁghting and acquiring resources through looting are higher than otherwise.
However, when GDP per capita is low, the government can also easily recruit for
the military and provide counterinsurgency measures. This suggests an important role
of the government in tax collection that builds revenue to protect the country – higher
GDP per capita equates to more government revenue through tax collection, greater
military capacity, and less opportunity for citizens to revolt.
2.6.2 Gross domestic product per capita growth
The growth in GDP per year in percentage terms from the World Development
Indicators database measures the overall growth in economic well-being per year per
person. Short-term changes in income can aﬀect the opportunity costs of rebellion as
previously mentioned. The loss of employment and education opportunities make
subversive activities more attractive by comparison. The less GDP growth in a given
year, the more likely is a civil war to begin.
2.6.3 Population
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Countries with large populations are at a higher risk of civil war than otherwise.
Collier and Hoeffler (2004) suggest that both opportunity and grievance-based motives
increase with population size. This variable comes from the World Development
Indicators 2013 dataset as well. Population and GDP per capita are logged variables to
decrease the variability that exists between countries.
John Maynard Keynes wrote about the economic consequences of World War I
before his popular work on the Great Depression. In Keynes (1919), Keynes highlights
the signiﬁcance of a large population leading to the Russian Civil War of late 1917:
“Thus the extraordinary occurrences of the past two years in Russia, that vast
upheaval of Society, which has overturned what seemed most stable...may owe
more to the deep inﬂuences of expanding numbers than to Lenin or to Nicholas;
and the disruptive powers of excessive national fecundity may have played a
greater part in bursting the bonds of convention than either the power of ideas or
the errors of autocracy.”
Keynes (1919) suggests that an expanding population may contribute more to
civil war than government folly or ideological motivation. Even in the year of 1919 the
underlying reasons for conﬂict were theorized to have motivations other than political or
ethnic grievance. This is central to the economic perspective of the onset of civil war.
2.6.8 Hyperinflation
Steve Hanke and Nicholas Krus are economists at the Johns Hopkins University
and they’ve collected 56 instances of hyperinﬂation dating back to the French
Revolution in 1795. The exchange rate between two countries is key to identifying
hyperinﬂation. Hanke explains, “the ratio of the price level between two countries is

51
equivalent to their exchange rate”. If one country experiences hyperinﬂation, then the
exchange rate with another country changes drastically. Two trading partners can
therefore both eventually experience hyperinﬂation as rising prices “travel” through
trade.
Most of the hyperinﬂation data is in terms of consumer prices since they “best
reﬂect price changes experienced by the ﬁnal consumer”. Hanke deﬁnes hyperinﬂation
according to Cagan (1956) which is a monthly inﬂation rate greater than 50 percent.
Both civil and international war are also associated with hyperinﬂation. Hanke
explains, “Hyperinﬂation is an economic malady that arises under extreme conditions:
war, political mismanagement, and the transition from a command to market-based
economy – to name a few.”19 A regime change, for instance due to a successful rebel
overthrow of government, can change the structure of government and therefore also
the economy.
2.6.9 Systemic banking crises
In the midst of the 2008 ﬁnancial crisis, two researchers from the International Monetary
Fund prepared a database on systemic banking crises with a focus on the timing and
type of crisis. This ﬁnancial crisis variable comes from the updated dataset in Valencia
and Laeven (2010) and identiﬁes the start and end of 42 banking crises.
I’ve identiﬁed these banking crises with a dummy variable taking the value of “1”
at the onset of crisis and every year during the crisis. The years for which no banking

19

The collection of hyperinflation events can be found at:
http://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/ﬁles/pubs/pdf/workingpaper-8.pdf.
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crisis occurred receive a value of “0”. This variable identiﬁes the onset and duration of
ﬁnancial crises associated with banking.
The timing of a banking crisis is determined by the amount of non-performing
loans as a percentage of total loans, gross ﬁscal costs and output loss as a percentage
of GDP, and minimum real GDP growth. The researchers cross-check the crisis dates
with the timing of deposit runs, deposit freezes, liquidity support, and bank interventions
(Valencia and Laeven, 2008). This variable is positively correlated with civil war.
Demand deposits and capital formation as a percentage of GDP, along with real
GDP growth are also described below as they are signiﬁcant predictors of the onset of
civil war in addition to ﬁnancial crisis. Many conditions requisite for ﬁnancial crisis are
also shared by civil war due to the relative decrease in opportunity costs of rebellion and
relative increase in beneﬁts through stolen commodities, rents on those commodities, or
government control and appropriation of wealth.
2.6.10 Financial crisis severity
Valencia and Laeven (2008) measure the output loss to GDP in the years
following the onset of ﬁnancial crisis to determine it’s severity. Therefore, the output loss
can be calculated as the diﬀerence between potential GDP and actual GDP over the
entire period of crisis. However, the estimate in Valencia and Laeven (2008) doesn’t
account for yearly losses in output.
Therefore, the ﬁnancial crisis dummy, which takes a value of “1” for every year in
which the crisis occurs, can be multiplied by the GDP growth rate from the WDI
database to determine the yearly declines in GDP associated with the systemic banking
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crisis. This variable operates as a measure of crisis severity20 – larger declines in GDP
will increase the risk of civil war given the economic (opportunistic) motivations for civil
war.
2.6.11 Deposit money - bank assets (percentage of GDP)
Valencia and Laeven (2008) explain, “In some cases, the crisis is triggered by
depositor runs on banks, though in most cases it is a general realization that
systemically important ﬁnancial institutions are in distress.” Banks that are in ﬁnancial
trouble will try to prevent customers from withdrawing their money through bank
holidays and deposit freezes to maintain what assets they do have in the midst of rising
costs from non-performing loans. This variable is measured as a percent of GDP and is
negatively related to conﬂict. More bank assets relative to GDP equate to less chance of
ﬁnancial crisis and civil war.
2.6.12 Gross capital formation (percentage of GDP)
During a systemic banking crisis, ﬁnancial capital is exhausted and capital ﬂows
may slow or even reverse (Valencia and Laeven, 2008). There will simply be less
demand for capital investment during crisis. This variable comes from the World
Development Indicators 2013 dataset and is measured as a percent of GDP. It is also
negatively related to ﬁnancial crises and civil war.
During a ﬁnancial crisis and civil war, people will seek stable sources of
investment for their wealth. The possibility of looting during civil war is higher than

An alternate method may involve ﬁnding the average output loss per year associated
with the crisis, similar to ﬁnding the average number of battle deaths per year
associated with civil war in the following chapter.
20
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otherwise and a bank in arrears may not oﬀer such stability. Therefore, one would
expect less domestic capital investment.
2.6.13 Male enrollment in secondary education
The combatants in civil wars are likely to be young men. If young men choose to
attend school, then they increase the opportunity cost of participating in rebellion. The
foregone future wages from a secondary school education must be equal to or less than
the future beneﬁt of rebellion for a young man to ﬁght in a civil conﬂict. Therefore, fewer
young males will be in school in a country at higher risk for civil war.
Collier and Hoeffler (2004) also ﬁnd a highly signiﬁcant relationship between the
onset of conﬂict and male enrollment in secondary school. This variable is included to
establish similarity between past research and the current paper, comes from the WDI
2013 dataset, and has a negative relationship to the onset of civil war.
2.6.14 Fuel exports (percentage of merchandise exports)
Countries that have more exports comprised of oil, diamonds, and other natural
resources are at higher risk for civil war since the acquisition of such goods can be
ﬁnancially lucrative. A government can also extract high rents from the production and
exportation of oil thus increasing the beneﬁt of civil war for government control. Collier
and Hoeffler (2004) explain that grievances play a role in recruitment of rebels, but
sometimes the underlying reasons for civil unrest are economic.
The ﬁnancing of rebellion, according to Collier and Hoeffler (2004) and Dodds
(2002), involves the extortion of natural resources. Collier models this extortion through
the presence of high levels of primary commodity exports which include conﬂict
resources like oil and diamonds. Fearon (2005) argues that the inclusion of primary
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commodity exports in Collier (2004) may capture a real driver of conﬂict which is oil
exportation. The oil exportation variable presented in this paper is fuel exports as a
percentage of merchandise exports from the World Development Indicators 2013
database21. It is positively correlated with the onset of civil war. When fuel exports
comprise a large percentage of exports, the probability of conﬂict is higher.
2.7

Grievance-based indicators of conflict
2.7.1 Ethnic fractionalization
Many of the conﬂict models mentioned previously include a measure of ethnic

diversity called ethnic fractionalization. James Fearon collected this data by country and
year with each data point measured as a value between 0 and 1. If you randomly select
two people from a population, this variable measures the probability that they came
from different ethnic groups. Therefore, countries with values close to one are ethnically
heterogeneous (diverse) and countries close to 0 are ethnically homogenous.
Previous work from Fearon and Laitin (2003) and Collier and Hoeffler (2004)
have found that “more ethnically diverse countries show no strong tendency to have a
greater risk of civil wars if one compares states at similar levels of economic
development” (Collier and Hoeffler, 2004). One explanation for this is that grievances
are not shared equally among different ethnic groups and it is therefore harder to
organize and recruit for a rebellion in ethnically diverse communities. This variable is
generally negative in determining conﬂict - the more ethnically-heterogeneous the
society, the smaller the chance of civil war.

21

This variable is also similar to primary commodity exports used in Reynal-Querol
(2002).
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However, when a country has greater than 45percent ethnic majority, then it is
sufficiently homogenized and ripe for rebel organization and government oppression.
The majority group is then large enough to oppress the minority group through
government policy and other social means. This ethnic majority dummy variable is
positively related to civil war.
2.7.2 Democracy
Polity is another signiﬁcant determinant of civil war used in Fearon and Laitin
(2003) and Collier and Hoeffler (2004) that measures democracy on a scale from -10 to
+10. Strongly democratic governments will receive positive values close to 10 and more
autocratic governments receive negative values close to -10. This variable is negatively
related to all forms of conﬂict – more democratic societies lead to less conﬂict.
One reason for this is that people of minority ethnic backgrounds have more
inﬂuence in government policy in democratic societies. With government representation,
there is less reason to hold grievances against the ethnic majority (Ellingsen, 2000).
However, in terms of changing government policy, democratic societies are much less
effective (Reynal-Querol, 2002).
2.7.3 Political constraints
The feasibility of government policy change is a very high determinant of the risk
of civil war onset. We might expect more feasible policy changes in democratic
governments and if people see that a government can change, then they are less likely
to rebel against it; however, this is not the case.
Reynal-Querol (2002) discusses this relationship between political systems and
conﬂict. She concludes that in a proportional system (a politically fractionalized
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government) the “opportunity cost of rebellion is higher than in a majoritarian system”
Reynal-Querol, 2002). She explains that this representation in government is more
important for peace than the level of democracy, i.e. polity.
With more political constraint, and less change in government policy, we see a
lower risk of civil war. The index score ranges from 0 to 1 with “higher scores indicating
more political constraint” (Teorell et al., 2015). The index accounts for the number of
branches in government with veto power, the degree of party alignment within the
branches (less party alignment means more political constraint), and the degree to
which preferences are unaligned within each legislative branch, i.e. legislative
fractionalization. A divided house will not fall and also will not change government
policy.
A more diverse government actually allows for more political constraints, less
chance of changing government policy, and less chance of civil uprising. If people see
that a government can change its policies easily, they are more likely to rebel.
Legislative fractionalization may be the driver in increasing the risk of civil war.
The countries in which civil wars occur have very low political constraints –a
great deal of party alignment in legislative branches, fewer independent branches with
veto power, and majority preferences in common. In aggregate, this allows for easy
change to government policy and more probably policy change in favor of the majority
group.
The political constraints index highlights the importance of political representation
in government – less minority representation equates to fewer political constraints and a
higher risk of civil war. This variable actually performs much better than the traditional
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inclusion of ethnic fractionalization and polity over a long time period with many
observations. It is a variable from the Quality of Governance dataset from Teorell et al.
(2015).
2.7.4 Regime durability
The duration of peace between civil wars has been an explanatory variable in
previous conﬂict models22 and regime durability measures the number of years since a
change in regime (government). The change in government is indicated by a 0 and
every year that follows receives a value of 1 until the next regime change. The regime
change is determined by the polity scale in a year for which the country becomes
substantially more democratic or autocratic (+/- 3 points). This is another Quality of
Governance indicator variable.
2.7.5 Cold War and fuel export dummy variables23
A dummy variable has been proposed in the conﬂict literature to distinguish
between times before and after the Cold War (Lacina, 2004; Collier and Hoeffler, 2004;
Collier and Rohner, 2008). This Cold War variable takes the value of 1 for years after
1990 and 0 otherwise. The inclusion of this dummy does not signiﬁcantly improve the
regressions, except in Africa where the prevalence of conﬂict increased in the 1990s.
Fuel exports greater than 30percent of total exports have been hypothesized as
signiﬁcant contributors to the onset of conﬂict in Fearon (2003); however, this variable
does not enter signiﬁcantly into any variants of the onset regression.

22
23

One example is from Collier and Hoeffler (2004).

These variables were insignificant in my regressions and therefore not included in the
tables or results.
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2.7.6 Inequality – Gini index
To better model the eﬀect of grievance on civil war, we must also consider
income inequality. A country that distributes wealth more evenly is less likely to
experience civil unrest on average. Grievances occur when wealth is concentrated
among a small percentage of the population and the rest are left in poverty.
Typically emerging countries have greater income inequality than developed
countries – as a country develops, wealth is accrued, and people can aﬀord better
government services. More money is acquired by the government and distributed
equally among citizens as the country develops. The developed country is also less
likely to have its citizens rebel and overthrow a government which improves their living
conditions.
The Gini index is measured on a scale from 0 to 100 with countries closer to zero
having very equal distribution of income and countries closer to 100 having more
income inequality. As a reference point, the U.S. had a GINI index value of 46.4 in 2004
and a conﬂict-prone country, Nicaragua, had a score of 52.3 in 2005.
2.8

Methods
The logit model estimates a binary dependent variable which takes only the

values of one or zero. This dependent variable is qualitative in nature which means it
explains something like an event, instead of a dollar value or quantitative amount. In
contrast to a linear probability model, like with ordinary least squares, the logit model
generates coefficients which are the change in the log odds of civil war’s onset with an
increase of one unit in the independent variable. To make practical sense of the effect
of financial crises on civil war, we determine predicted probabilities for an average
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country in the entire data set and in each subsample. This probability is sometimes
called the response probability (Wooldridge, 2008) and takes a value between 0 and 1:
𝑃(𝑦 = 1|𝑥) = 𝑃(𝑦 = 1|𝑥1 , 𝑥2 , … , 𝑥𝑘 )
A fixed-effects estimation with static variables such as ethnic and religious
fractionalization along with polity (our measure of democracy) is inappropriate and
random-effects is chosen instead. The Hausman test can verify our choice as well, but
in simply comparing regression results, the logit and panel time-series logit models are
very similar.
Fixed-effects estimation controls for ceteris paribus effects through the arbitrary
correlation between ai and xitj . With static variables, i.e. variables which do not change
over time, fixed-effects estimation is not appropriate. With random-effects estimation we
expect some unobserved effect which is not correlated with other independent variables
(Wooldridge, 2008). The random-effects logit estimator for panel time-series has the
following form:
𝑃(𝑦𝑖𝑗 = 1|𝑥𝑖𝑗 , 𝑢𝑖 ) = 𝐹(𝑥𝑖𝑗 𝑏 + 𝑢𝑖 )
One issue with using logit models is the lack of R2 or simply a good measure of
fit. Log likelihood values are only effective when comparing one regression model to
another. Therefore, as a very basic means of comparability between models I include
the log likelihood values in each table of results for the onset of war.
2.9

Estimating the onset of civil war
During a civil war, it is difficult to distinguish between rebel ﬁghters and looters or

bandits. Early models of conﬂict by Grossman (1999) suggest that civil insurrections can
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generate proﬁtable opportunities that a time of peace may not. The impetus from this
viewpoint is greed, not grievance.
If economic conditions like low GDP per capita, low GDP growth, and a high
percentage of commodity exports can determine the risk of conﬂict’s onset, then an
economic event like a ﬁnancial crisis which lowers consumer wealth and drains
government budgets can also predict the onset of war. At the onset of a ﬁnancial crisis,
bank deposits are low due to consumers removing their wealth from the unstable
institutions. With bank assets declining and ﬁnancial costs rising due to non-performing
loans, banks typically lend less money to their customers. As a result, business
investment declines and the percentage of capital formation to GDP also declines.
Although ﬁnancial crises begin for many different reasons, this is a common theme
since ﬁnancial crises have been recorded in 1970.
2.10

Results
2.10.1 The opportunity model
I regress the onset of conﬂict in the entire sample on the base regression

variables from Collier’s opportunity model with the inclusion of speciﬁc ﬁnancial crisis
predictors. The results in Table 23 indicate the strong predictors of GDP growth, GDP
per capita, peace, and population on civil war’s risk.
Model 1 and 2 in Table 23 are close reproductions of the opportunity model in
Collier and Hoeffler (2004); however, they show that fuel exports as a percentage of
merchandise exports (and it’s square) do not signiﬁcantly predict civil war. This variable
measures only fuel exports, similar to Fearon (2005), instead of primary commodity
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exports from Collier and Hoeffler (2004). James Fearon presents a host of reasons24
why primary commodity exports are inappropriate in a country-year analysis in Fearon
(2005); therefore I use a variable more related to fuel exports as he suggests.
The economic variables of GDP growth, population, GDP per capita and the
measure of regime durability (peace) from Table 23 Model 3 significantly predict the risk
of civil war. Now with a base regression of significant variables, I add financial variables
that may predict the risk of conflict.
In Model 4 of Table 23, the deposits to GDP variable is included as an
expression of banking health and consumer conﬁdence in banks as a storehouse of
wealth. If people do not trust banks to remain solvent, then they remove their assets
and ﬁnancial markets suffer.
If declining bank deposits are related to ﬁnancial crisis, then it makes sense to
simply test the start and duration of a ﬁnancial crisis on civil war’s onset. In Model 5
from Table 23 the ﬁnancial crisis dummy variable has no signiﬁcant effect when the
crisis occurs in the same year as the civil war’s onset. The ﬁnancial crisis does have a
signiﬁcant effect in Model 6 of Table 23 when it occurs 5 years before the beginning of
civil war. This suggests that a ﬁnancial crisis has some relation to a civil war when it
precedes the war by 5 years.
The coefficients from random-effects logit estimation, for example in Model 6 of
Table 23, do not represent predicted probabilities, but log odds of civil war’s onset. The
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Fearon (2005) argues mainly that primary commodity exports are driven by oil exports
which is evident in a yearly analysis, instead of the 5-year panel from Collier and
Hoeffler (2004).
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risk of civil war’s onset when an average country has faced a financial crisis 5 years
prior are approximately 1.6percent in the opportunity model. This small risk must be
considered in the context of a completely average country – when other factors are
taken into account, this risk increases substantially as is evidenced in later analysis.
2.10.2 The grievance model
The political science literature often explains the onset of war in terms of
political/governance and grievance variables25. Collier and Hoeffler (2004) propose a
model similar to Table 24, wherein ethnic fractionalization, religious fractionalization,
ethnic dominance, democracy, regime durability, and population determine the onset of
civil war. In Table 24 Model 1, religious fractionalization does not seem to play any
signiﬁcant role in the onset of war26. The Gini measure of inequality is measured
separately due to low observation numbers in Table 24 Model 2 and is only signiﬁcant
at 10percent. This may explain conﬂict’s onset better than ethnic fractionalization as
ethnic fractionalization and the ethnic majority variables lose significance. It is likely that
ethnic groups are also divided by income such that these variables are related.
In any case, by dropping the insigniﬁcant variables, a highly signiﬁcant base
regression can be tested with new variables: political constraints, deposits to GDP, and
the ﬁnancial crisis dummy. Political constraint is a measure of legislative
fractionalization that leads to new government policy changes. This variable, as
opposed to polity, has been proposed to be the real driver behind non-democratic
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However, new literature has taken more economic factors into account.
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This non-effect has been suggested before in Collier and Hoeffler (2004).
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governments’ experience of conﬂict (Reynal-Querol, 2002). In Table 24 Model 3 the
variable enters signiﬁcantly and is therefore used in the combined model’s analysis that
follows.
The addition of ﬁnancial variables do not work very well in tandem with measures
of political grievance. Only the deposit assets to GDP variable explains the onset of
conﬂict signiﬁcantly in Table 24 Model 4. The 5-year lagged crisis variable predicts
war’s onset with probability of 2percent. It may be more instructive to consider the
political grievance variables together with economic opportunity variables in Table 25.
2.10.3 The combined grievance and opportunity model
The combined opportunity and grievance model in Table 25 closely follows
specifications in Collier and Hoeffler (2004): fuel exports as a percentage of total
merchandise exports, fuel exports squared, GDP per capita, GDP growth, peace,
population, ethnic fractionalization, religious fractionalization, ethnic dominance,
democracy, and political constraints on passing new government policy. From Model 1
to Model 2 in Table 25, I drop the insigniﬁcant variables of fuel exports and religious
fractionalization which were previously determined insignificant. Model 2 shows the
greater explanatory power of economic variables as opposed to political variables in the
onset of civil war27. Also, a combination of variables from Models 1 and 2 from Table 25
become the base regressions in all subsample estimations by region and income that
follow.

27

This comparison is a key discovery from Collier and Hoeffler (2004) and provides
evidence for economic explanatory power in civil war, instead of the common grievancerelated explanations for conﬂict.
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The banking crisis dummy variable should not signiﬁcantly predict the onset of
civil war in the current period, but it predicts civil war 5 years after the crisis incidence.
The interpretation of the crisis coefficient in Table 25 Model 4 is the log odds of civil war
risk – the predicted probability of civil war due to a financial crisis in an average country
is 1.8 percent.
For the case of Indonesia and Guinea-Bissau, in Figures 1 and 2, the severity of
the banking crisis may also play a role in the probability of civil war. The severity of a
financial crisis determines the decline in consumer wealth, economic opportunities, and
government budgets. In Table 25 Model 5, this 5-year lagged variable, along with
deposits to GDP, is significant at the 10 percent level. The greater the ﬁnancial crisis,
the larger the decline in GDP, and the higher the probability of war’s onset28. The fewer
deposits a bank has on reserve as assets, the greater the probability of war as
consumers distrust the bank’s ability to hold their wealth and governments buy out
insolvent banks and depreciated assets.
During this 5 year period, the government is typically heavily indebted. Reinhart
and Rogoff (2009) explain that “on average, government debt rises by 86 [percent]
during the three years following a banking crisis”. If we consider highly-indebted poor
countries, 25 percent are conﬂict affected and most of these are in Sub-Saharan Africa.
Therefore, I divide the sample by continent and analyze the continents where most civil
wars occur: Africa and Asia.

28

See discussion of highly-indebted poor countries and low income countries for a more
in-depth analysis.
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2.10.4 Civil war’s onset in Africa
We suspect that African or Asian economies are driving the 4 to 5 year
signiﬁcance of the crisis variable in the entire sample. After all, from the civil wars listed
in Tables 34 through 36, developed countries that experience a ﬁnancial crisis do not
usually experience a civil war afterward. Table 26 Model 1 shows that very few of the
independent variables significantly contribute to the risk of civil war in Africa. I drop
insignificant variables in Model 2 and settle on Model 3: population, GDP growth and
democracy are important African indicators of war.
From Model 4 in Table 26, adding a systemic banking crisis dummy variable
significantly predicts the onset of civil war in Africa 5 years after the crisis event. The
risk of conﬂict in an average African country increases to 3.6 percent; however, this
crisis variable should be considered in conjunction with other independent variables. For
example, we will see that if a financial crisis predicts civil war and the country has an
ethnic majority, the probability of conflict increases substantially.
The severity of such systemic banking crises is also important in Africa 29. If a
banking crisis is associated with steep declines in GDP, this raises the probability of civil
war in proportion to the size of crisis according to economic theories of conflict.
2.10.5 Civil war’s onset in Asia
Asian countries, in contrast to Africa, are affected more quickly by systemic
banking crises. In Table 27 Models 1 and 2, several independent variables
insignificantly explain conflict’s onset and are dropped. Model 3 includes GDP per
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However, crisis severity is not important in Asia in terms of civil war risk.
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capita, GDP growth and population as significant predictors of war risk. In Model 4, the
current period financial crisis has no effect, but a ﬁnancial crisis can increase the risk of
civil war by 5.6 percent over a time span of 2 years.
From Models 6 and 7 in Table 27, declines in capital formation play a greater role
in Asia than Africa30. The predicted probabilities of conflict change depending on the
range of capital formation as a percent of GDP the country currently experiences. For
instance, an average country with 0 to 10 percent capital formation significantly
increases war risk by 5.6 percent. With 10 to 20 percent capital formation, there is a 3.3
percent probability of war and from 20 to 30 percent capital formation there is a 2
percent chance of conflict. These probabilities of conflict can be taken in tandem with
financial crises: civil war’s risk increases from 5.6 to 15 percent, 3.3 to 9.5 percent, and
from 2 to 5.9 percent over the previously mentioned intervals of capital formation. Each
variable’s contribution to the onset of war must be considered with other significant
predictors in order to find the total probability of war beginning.
2.10.6 Civil war for government control and over local issues
The economic explanations for conﬂict deal with falling opportunity costs and loss
of wealth. The well-known losses to wealth and employment during and after a ﬁnancial
crisis seem to contribute to the risk of conﬂict in a country. However, it is not clear what
type of conﬂict arises from ﬁnancial losses - a war for government control or simply a
war over local issues? Tables 28 and 29 display the results for the onset of both types
of wars and includes ﬁnancial crisis variables.
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However, bank deposits to GDP are important predictors of war’s onset in Africa.
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In Table 28, a war for government control is motivated by low GDP per capita
and GDP growth, the extent to which government policy represents the will of the
people, and the number of years the state has peacefully governed. Ethnic diversity and
population size play no role in motivating war for government control. A systemic
banking crisis which occurs concurrently with civil war does not explain the war’s onset.
However, 5 years after the incidence of ﬁnancial crisis the risk of civil war for
government control becomes 0.96 percent.
Governance variables like political constraints, levels of democracy, and regime
stability are very important determinants for a civil war for government control. However,
they are important to the extent that they inﬂuence income per capita and growth.
Grievances are fueled when an opposition party has no inﬂuence on government policy.
A government at risk of being usurped offers shorter periods of peace and
homogeneous government representation.
Civil wars fought over local issues, in Table 29, have different determinants than
wars fought for government control. Population size and GDP growth are strong
determinants for wars involving local issues. Governance does not play any role in
these wars except to the extent that a government prevented such wars from occurring
in the past. Such wars may also be more spontaneous and involve less planning than a
government takeover. In any case, a systemic banking crisis precedes wars over local
issues by 2 years and the probability of civil war for local issues is 0.4 percent.
2.10.7 Civil war in highly-indebted poor countries (HIPC)
If government spending and debt play a role in the onset of civil war, perhaps the
highly-indebted poor countries are at more risk of civil war than countries with low
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income. If civil war happens more frequently as a result of ﬁnancial crises in the
indebted countries, then the probability of war in the HIPC subsample will be larger.
First, in Table 30 Models 1 and 2, the other explanatory variables explain the
onset of civil war poorly due to few observations in the fuel exportation variable and less
explanatory power of population and governance variables. In Model 2, dropping the
fuel exportation variable yields just over 1,000 observations; in Model 3, the GDP per
capita level, GDP growth, maintaining an ethnic majority, and democracy explain the
onset of war signiﬁcantly in highly-indebted poor countries. From this base regression
an analysis of ﬁnancial crisis’ role takes place.
From Table 30 Models 4 and 5, the coefficient on the banking crisis dummy is
1.30 in HIPC as opposed to 0.61 in the entire sample and 0.96 in Africa for the 5-year
lag and 1.32 in Asia for the 2-year lag. Highly-indebted poor countries share with Asia
the greatest risk of civil war resulting from the incidence of ﬁnancial crisis. This link
between indebted countries and civil war has received little attention in the conﬂict
literature.
To strengthen the debt connection with civil war, I compare a sample of lowincome countries to the highly-indebted poor countries. Ethnic dominance, GDP growth
and democracy are significant determinants of civil war in both low income and highlyindebted poor countries. I compare the financial crisis dummy and crisis severity
variables to find that the risk of conflict following an incidence of financial crisis is higher
in the indebted poor countries. However, the severity of a financial crisis more
significantly determines civil war’s onset in low-income countries. If a low-income

70
country also has an ethnic majority, the predicted probabilities of war more than double
in some cases.
2.10.8 Civil war and hyperinflation
Another financial event that erodes consumer wealth and decreases the
opportunity costs of joining a rebellion is hyperinflation. The connection between war,
international and civil war, and hyperinflation is easily seen after World War I and II in
Hungary, other post-WWII European countries, and African countries in the 1990s
during the African World War. Hyperinflation occurs after large, international wars, but
an argument can be made that it starts civil wars as well.
I collect the base regressions from each subsample in Table 33 and include the
hyperinflation dummy variable which is constructed identically to the financial crisis
variable (It takes the value of 1 for every year in which prices increase, even for a short
time period, more than 50 percent). Hyperinflation has no significant effect in the entire
sample simply due to its rare occurrence.
However, the Democratic Republic of Congo and Angola have instances of
reoccurring and prolonged hyperinflation in the 1990s. These significant events drive
the estimation results in Africa (Table 33 Model 2) and yield the largest coefficient in
civil war’s risk yet, 2.25, which are log odds of the outcome of war. These were wars for
government control and only the Democratic Republic of Congo is a highly-indebted
poor country.
2.11

Conclusion
This paper builds upon the previous economic models of conﬂict proposed by

Collier and Hoeffler (2004) by including systemic banking crisis and ﬁnancial variables
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associated with crisis. The event of ﬁnancial crisis decreases personal wealth and
therefore the opportunity cost of joining a rebellion. It also depletes a government’s
budget through purchases of non-performing loans and protecting banks from
insolvency. This implies a tradeoff with spending on services, infrastructure, and
monetary concessions to rebel groups. The indebted government becomes weak and
ripe for rebel takeover.
I showed this through panel-time series logit estimation of the onset of conﬂict
with economic and political variables common in the conﬂict literature and ﬁnancial
variables. A systemic banking crisis increases the chance of civil war in 2 and 5 years
by between 3.6 and 5.6 percent in Asian and African economies. Civil wars develop
more quickly as a result of ﬁnancial conditions in Asia than in Africa. A civil war for
government control is preceded by a ﬁnancial crisis within 5 years and civil war over
local issues is preceded by crisis within 2 years of its onset.
By comparing low-income and highly-indebted poor countries, evidence arises
for the role of strong governance in preventing civil wars. A government in debt due to
ﬁnancial crisis faces a spending tradeoff between supporting insolvent banks and
providing services for its citizens that improve well-being. Strong ﬁnancial institutions in
which people store their wealth are also important. When people do not deposit their
money into banks, they are insecure about their expected future wealth and this
increases the risk of civil uprising. If the government cannot insure a stable environment
for capital to accrue, the risk of conﬂict also rises.
The probability of civil war increases substantially in low-income countries when
controlling for other conditions like an ethnic majority with financial crises. This suggests
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that to practically consider a country’s risk for civil war, all significant variables must be
taken into account and not just the probability associated with a single financial crisis
event (ceteris paribus).
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Figure 4: Severe banking crises in Indonesia and civil war's onset

Figure 5: Severe banking crises in Guinea-Bissau and civil war's onset
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Table 22: Civil war's onset

Table 23: Opportunity model: Random-effects logistic regression for civil war's
onset 1970-2007
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Table 24: Grievance model: Random-effects logistic regression for civil war's
onset 1970-2007
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Table 25: Combined model: Random-effects logistic regression for civil war's
onset 1970-2007

77
Table 26: African model for civil war's onset 1970-2007
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Table 27: Asian model for civil war's onset 1970-2007
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Table 28: Onset of civil war for government control 1970-2007
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Table 29: Onset of civil war fought over local issues 1970-2007
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Table 30: HIPC model for civil war's onset 1970-2007
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Table 31: PRIO combined model: Random-effects logistic regression for civil
war's onset 1970-2007
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Table 32: Penn World Tables combined model: Random-effects logistic
regression for civil war's onset 1970-2007
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Table 33: Hyperinflation and civil war's onset 1970-2007
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Table 34: African banking crises and civil war 1970-2007
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Table 35: Asian banking crises and civil war 1970-2007
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Table 36: All other banking crises and civil war 1970-2007
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CHAPTER 3
CIVIL WAR SEVERITY AND THE ECONOMY

3.1

Introduction
Studying the determinants of war’s severity has practical importance in terms of

government policy decisions and their implications for future economic growth. If the
effects of war can be ameliorated through decisive government action, then this seems
to be a beneficial option for all parties involved. The economic theories of conflict
revolve around opportunity costs associated with rebellion such that when the
opportunity cost of joining a rebellion is sufficiently low, then the potential rebel has
economic incentive to cause strife. Therefore, if the opportunity costs of war rise
through the effect of development assistance and aid, employment, and stable prices,
then people will abstain from conflict activities and the effects of war will be less severe.
This paper addresses the question of what drives the severity of civil war and
what policy decisions may be taken to ameliorate the detrimental effects of war.
Severity is measured by average civil war battle deaths per year and determined
according to political and economic variables commonly associated with conflict such as
aid, unemployment, and hyperinflation. Lacina (2006) uses civil war duration, but does
not account for endogeneity with civil war severity. Therefore, the main estimation
procedure of this paper is generalized method of moment estimation with an
instrumental variable to account for the endogeneity of civil war's duration in
determining war's severity. Economic variables associated with war such as aid,
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unemployment, and hyperinflation are included as explanatory variables and provide a
basis for government policy decisions during the civil war.
The economic theories of civil war outlined in Collier and Hoeffler (2004) are
critical in understanding the contribution of this paper. Opportunity costs, diminishing
wealth, and potential benefits of looting explain the motivations for civil strife. The first
estimation of civil war's severity from Lacina (2006) involves ordinary least squares
regression techniques that find civil war's duration, the end of the cold war, levels of
democracy, and ethnic polarization to be significant predictors of a civil war's severity.
However, the duration of war and its severity may endogenously determine one
another31. Another issue which is not addressed in Lacina (2006) is the time-varying
nature of civil war's severity.
This paper explains the severity of war in economic terms by analyzing the effect
of aid, unemployment and hyperinflation. These variables have often been associated
with war, but they've never explicitly been used to determine the severity of war. This
paper considers a panel time-series estimation with instrumental variables instead of
the first proposed ordinary least squares. This estimation captures annual changes in
war severity by country and controls for a possible endogeneity problem with the

31

Also, in practical terms, government policy which shortens a war will also make it less
severe which leads to the question of what can shorten a civil war? Or how can a
government become more democratic? The answer may be the civil war itself which
cannot help diminish war severity.
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duration of war. Concluding remarks suggest possible government policy for a practical
amelioration of severe conflict.
The literature related to civil war's severity is first summarized with attention to
motivations behind the inclusion of certain variables. The construction of severity is then
explained and followed by a description of the predictors of these average annual battle
deaths. The model and results using IV/GMM estimation precedes the conclusion which
entails a short description of possible government policy to decrease a civil war's
severity.
3.2

Literature review
3.2.1 Conflict literature related to civil war’s severity
The summary of literature related to civil war's severity is relatively short (Lacina

and Gleditsch, 2005) in comparison to civil war's duration and onset, but the point of
departure must be Lacina (2006). Lacina (2006) estimates state-based armed conflicts
as specified from the Uppsala/PRIO database with ordinary least squares. In this
research each conflict occurrence and the related battle deaths exist as single data
points which amount to at most 114 observations. However, the severity of war may
change over time with the introduction of international participants, new sources of
government wealth, and changes to the economic well-being of active participants.
Civil war's severity can be measured in different contexts such as conventional
and irregular warfare in Balcells and Kalyvas (2014). Here they suggest the "technology
of rebellion" is important as civil war is not only a political contest, but a military contest
as well. One important takeaway from Balcells and Kalyvas (2014) is their measure of
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average battle deaths per month which suggests that averaging battle deaths is a valid
tool for understanding conflict's severity.32
The onset and severity of conflict can be estimated together since they "are
distinct but interconnected decisions and should be estimated as such" (Ritter 2014). In
Ritter (2014) a relationship between political survival and repression and dissent is
estimated using Tobit regression techniques. She finds that a secure leader is likely to
pursue peaceful governance until conflict begins and the governing leader escalates
conflict along with the rebel party - thus increasing conflict's severity. In any case, the
inter-relationship between conflict's onset and severity is central to this paper's
proposed estimation model.
3.2.2 The relationship between unemployment and civil war
Several development factors influence the motivations for war such as growth,
infant mortality, and unemployment Buhaug and Lujala (2013). However, Buhaug and
Lujala (2013) suggest that such aspects "should be measured at a sub-national level"
since data organized by country cannot approximate conflict zones as accurately. They
address this problem, but if a civil war is sufficiently severe, then changes in
unemployment will be noticeable with country-level data which is used in this paper.
Hartzell, Hoddie and Rothchild (2001) explain the cumulative nature of "poverty,
unemployment, land pressures, [an] inadequate tax base, [a] lack of education, and
insufficient or unavailable human skills" which operate as government constraints to
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A monthly specification of conflict's duration is common using survival analysis.
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regulation and social compliance. This government weakness to resolve such issues
"heightens insecurity" (Hartzell, Hoddie and Rothchild, 2001). Unemployment
contributes to this insecurity although it is often absent in typical estimations of civil war
due to the reasons listed previously.
3.2.3 The role of debt and aid in civil war
Debt relief can play a crucial role in addressing "past neglect and discrimination"
as inequality in government spending can cause social grievances (Addison and
Murshed, 2003). Highly-indebted poor countries have weak social contracts such that a
collapse of the contract and ensuing civil war will be related to "favouritism in public
spending" and unjust taxation (Addison and Murshed, 2003). The effects of debt relief
and development aid, our variable of interest, are strongly positive during and after a
civil war.33
3.3

Civil war deaths
The severity of war in Lacina (2006) is measured by the number of combatant

and civilian battle deaths incurred by both sides in a given year. In a time series
regression, the battle deaths must be recorded for each year in a meaningful way. The
Correlates of War database records the total number of combatant battle deaths for
both sides over the course of the civil war, not the deaths incurred per year. Given this

33

However, aid and debt relief in general to African countries has been suggested to
have a negative eﬀect on development in Kanbur (2000) and food aid from the U.S.
may have a positive eﬀect on the incidence, onset and duration of civil war in Nunn and
Qian (2011).
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method of data collection, and the fact that regression analysis reports coefficients for
an average country in an average year, it makes sense to use average battle deaths34.
The years without battle deaths receive a “0” and the years of civil war in which
no reliable record of battle deaths are available are excluded from the dataset. We
cannot simply give a zero value when deaths had almost certainly occurred, nor can we
give an average amount of battle deaths if the actual number may be much more or
much less. Therefore, we simply exclude these combatant deaths from the sample.
The Correlates of War codebook35 describes these occasions as “data unknown”
or “not applicable” which means the total amount of battle deaths are unknown or there
were no battle deaths for one side. The Intra-state war database records wars that take
place “within the recognized territory of a state” and “the war must involve sustained
combat, involving organized armed forces, resulting in a minimum of 1,000 battlerelated combatant fatalities within a twelve month period”
(http://cow.dss.ucdavis.edu/data-sets/COW-war/intra-state-war-data-codebook).
3.4

Predictors of civil war’s severity
3.4.1 Civil war’s duration
Civil war’s duration (see Table 1) is measured as the cumulative number of years

in which a country has experienced civil war. Civil war duration measured in Lacina

34

See Table 37 on p. 105 with the civil war severity variable defined as average battle
deaths.
35

The intra-state wars codebook can be found at: http://cow.dss.ucdavis.edu/datasets/COW-war/intra-state-war-data-codebook.
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(2006) is simply the length of a civil war – an appropriate specification for ordinary least
squares, but data organized in a panel time-series fashion should measure duration
differently. For instance, in Collier et al. (2004), duration is measured as a dummy
variable in monthly survival analysis. The goal of my estimation is to find the effect of
increasing number of years engaged in civil war and my specification in Table 1 aims to
find this effect.
Fearon (2004) explains civil war duration using a game theoretic model of
credible commitments that suggest that settlement is more likely when the government’s
army is strong.” Therefore, I test military strength as an instrument to control for
endogeneity in civil war’s duration and severity. However, Fearon (2004) explains that
there is no agreed upon set up determinants for civil war’s duration, but democracy and
military strength seem to be related to duration.
3.4.2 Regime durability
The duration of peace between civil wars has been an explanatory variable in
previous conﬂict models36 and regime durability measures the number of years since a
change in regime (government). The change in government is indicated by a 0 and
every year that follows receives a value of 1 until the next regime change. The regime
change is determined by the polity scale in a year for which the country becomes
substantially more democratic or autocratic (+/- 3 points).

36

Collier and Hoeffler (2004)
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3.4.3 Fuel exports (percent of merchandise exports)
Countries that have more exports comprised of oil, diamonds, and other natural
resources are at higher risk for civil war since the acquisition of such goods can be
ﬁnancially lucrative. A government can also extract high rents from the production and
exportation of oil thus increasing the beneﬁt of civil war for government control. Collier
(2004) explains that grievances play a role in recruitment of rebels, but sometimes the
underlying reasons for civil unrest are economic.
Fearon (2005) argues that the inclusion of primary commodity exports in Collier
(2004) may capture a real driver of conﬂict which is oil exportation. The oil exportation
variable presented in this paper is fuel exports as a percentage of merchandise exports
from the World Development Indicators 2013 database37. It is positively correlated with
the onset of civil war. When fuel exports comprise a large percentage of exports, the
probability of conﬂict is higher.
3.4.4 Hyperinﬂation
Steve Hanke and Nicholas Krus are economists at the Johns Hopkins University
and they’ve collected 56 instances of hyperinﬂation dating back to the French
Revolution in 1795. The exchange rate between two countries is key to identifying
hyperinﬂation. Hanke explains, “the ratio of the price level between two countries is
equivalent to their exchange rate”. If one country experiences hyperinﬂation, then the
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This variable is also similar to primary commodity exports used in Reynal-Querol
(2002).
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exchange rate with another country changes drastically. Two trading partners can
therefore both eventually experience hyperinﬂation as rising prices “travel” through
trade.
Most of the hyperinﬂation data is in terms of consumer prices since they “best
reﬂect price changes experienced by the ﬁnal consumer”. Hanke deﬁnes hyperinﬂation
according to Cagan (1956) which is a monthly inﬂation rate greater than 50 percent.
Both civil and international war are also associated with hyperinﬂation. Hanke
explains, “Hyperinﬂation is an economic malady that arises under extreme conditions:
war, political mismanagement, and the transition from a command to market-based
economy – to name a few.”38 A regime change, for instance due to a successful rebel
overthrow of government, can change the structure of government and therefore also
the economy.
3.4.5 Systemic banking crises
In the midst of the 2008 ﬁnancial crisis, two researchers from the International
Monetary Fund prepared a database on systemic banking crises with a focus on the
timing and type of crisis. The ﬁnancial crisis variable comes from Valencia and Laeven
(2008) and identiﬁes the start and end of 42 banking crises.
I’ve identiﬁed these banking crises with a dummy variable taking the value of 1 at
the onset of crisis and every year during the crisis. The years for which no banking crisis

38

http://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/ﬁles/pubs/pdf/workingpaper-8.pdf
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occurred receive a value of 0. This variable identiﬁes the onset and duration of ﬁnancial
crises associated with banking.
The timing of a banking crisis is determined by the amount of non-performing
loans as a percentage of total loans, gross ﬁscal costs and output loss as a percentage
of GDP, and minimum real GDP growth. The researchers cross-check the crisis dates
with the timing of deposit runs, deposit freezes, liquidity support, and bank interventions
(Valencia and Laeven, 2008). This variable is positively correlated with civil war.
Demand deposits and capital formation as a percentage of GDP, along with real
GDP growth are also described below as they are signiﬁcant predictors of the onset of
civil war in addition to ﬁnancial crisis. Many conditions requisite for ﬁnancial crisis are
also shared by civil war due to the relative decrease in opportunity costs of rebellion and
relative increase in beneﬁts through stolen commodities, rents on those commodities, or
government control and appropriation of wealth.
3.4.6 Military quality
A measure of state capacity to engage in counterinsurgency, military quality, is
deﬁned as military expenditure divided by the number of armed personnel. Both military
expenditure and armed personnel variables come from the World Development
Indicators 2013 dataset. A less severe war will involve a highly-trained military with
multiple resources at its disposal to suppress a rebel threat with minimal violence. This
variable is expected to be negatively correlated with the number of battle deaths, a
measure of war severity.
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3.4.7 Religious Fractionalization
There is some theory and less empirical evidence that religious divisions among
a society will cause rebellion and conﬂict (Elbadawi and Sambanis (2002); Ellingsen
(2000); Reynal-Querol (2002). From Lacina’s work on civil war severity, religious
diﬀerences do not signiﬁcantly predict more violent wars. However, there has been
some evidence on the role of religion in economic growth (Barro and McCleary, 2003)
and conﬂict (Reynal-Querol, 2002) and the model in Lacina (2006) can be improved
upon with the addition of certain variables.
The measure of religious fractionalization is similar to ethnic fractionalization –
the scale from 0 to 1 reﬂects the probability of selecting two random people from the
same religious group in a population. Empirical studies of conﬂict suggest that greater
religious diversity equates to less conﬂict. This variable typically has a positive
relationship to civil war.
3.4.8 Political Terror – U.S. State Department
This measure of terror from Teorell, Dahlberg, Holmberg, Rothstein, Hartmann
and Svensson (2015) does not take into account personal actors pursuing their own
ideological agenda apart from the state, i.e. Islamic terrorism in the West, but measures
political repression by a government. An example is a government leader murdering a
political opponent or detaining a political dissident indeﬁnitely.
The political terror index measures the power government has to oppress or
eliminate its citizens. A government which is not bound by human rights laws can more

99
easily kill civilians and rebels that cause political trouble. The index is scaled from 1 to 5
indicating the following:
5:

Terror has expanded to the whole population. The leaders of these
societies place no limits on the means or thoroughness with which they
pursue personal or ideological goals.

4:

Civil and political rights violations have expanded to large numbers of the
population. Murders, disappearances, and torture are a common part of
life. In spite of its generality, on this level terror aﬀects those who interest
themselves in politics or ideas.

3:

There is extensive political imprisonment, or a recent history of such
imprisonment. Execution or other political murders and brutality may be
common. Unlimited detention, with or without a trial, for political views is
accepted.

2:

There is a limited amount of imprisonment for nonviolent political activity.
However, few persons are aﬀected, torture and beatings are exceptional.
Political murder is rare.

1:

Countries under a secure rule of law, people are not imprisoned for their
view, and torture is rare or exceptional. Political murders are extremely
rare.
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3.5

Building a model of civil war’s severity
In considering a large sample of countries, a more detailed analysis of factors

occurring before a civil war is possible. For instance, it has been suggested that
recessions can spur a rebellion by lowering the opportunity costs associated with joining
war (Blomberg 2002). These economic recessions, and their wealth diminishing
characteristics, occur before a civil war and may contribute to the severity of war. Thus
a time-series regression can capture conditions before the onset of war which contribute
to the severity of a civil war.
Each country also has its own speciﬁc starting level of GDP and population which
suggests some usefulness in panel estimation. It’s not clear why battle deaths,
population, and GDP are logged in Lacina’s estimations; however, the reason may be
due to the inherent diﬀerences in levels of those variables within each country. A panel
estimation can account for this variation and allow the use of actual levels of battle
deaths, population and GDP. This estimation is useful in determining the contribution of
each variable to civil war’s severity - it is simply easier to understand practically the
coeﬃcients of non-logged variables.
One of the highly signiﬁcant predictors of civil war severity in Lacina (2006) is the
duration of conﬂict. The reason for this, presumably, is that longer civil wars result in
more battle-related deaths. However, it can also easily be argued that more battlerelated deaths result in longer civil wars. Deaths due to a civil war can fuel grievances
as rebel leaders are martyred or potential rebels witness the deaths of family and
friends and join the rebellion. Therefore, endogeneity may be a problem in the ordinary
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least squares regressions in Lacina (2006). To account for such endogeneity, I estimate
using instrumental variables in a generalized method of moment (IV/GMM) regression
framework.
IV/GMM estimation allows the researcher to control for the endogeneity of one
independent variable by instrumenting with another variable which shares a strong
positive or negative relationship. This instrument should also have very little relationship
with the dependent variable. (What is my instrument and for which variable?) Therefore,
the model I propose is a panel time-series estimation using IV/GMM.
Some contention may arise using these methods with a data set that includes
times of peace, i.e. no battle deaths. Since the dependent variable contains not only
battle deaths, but zero battle deaths, we’re also measuring the onset of civil war.
Therefore, it makes sense that some of the variables which predict the onset of war will
also predict the severity of war simply due to the setup of this model.
3.6

Estimating civil war’s severity
The original regressions of conﬂict variables with log battle deaths from Lacina

(2006) in Table 1 Models 1 and 4 reveal that longer wars, wars after 1990, wars in nondemocratic nations, and wars in ethnically homogeneous countries are more severe.
From Chapter 2, ﬁnancial crises and hyperinﬂation increase the risk of civil war for
reasons of economic opportunity; however, perhaps such wars are also more severe for
similar economic reasons.
Therefore, I include dummy variables of ﬁnancial crisis and hyperinﬂation when
such events occur concurrently with the civil war or within ﬁve years previous of war’s

102
onset. The previous paper explained that the eﬀects ﬁnancial crises and hyperinﬂation
may not be felt immediately, but compound over time. Thus wars associated with these
economic events may be more severe and even last longer.
The hyperinﬂation variable enters into the OLS regressions signiﬁcantly in Table
1 Models 2 and 5 and predict more severe wars. Financial crises do not signiﬁcantly
explain the severity of civil wars, but this may be due to the time span of the dataset
from 1946 to 2002. Financial crises became more prevalent in the 1990s and 2000s and
the dataset of ﬁnancial crises only goes back to 1970. Therefore, several years of civil
war which may be associated with ﬁnancial crises are not included in the estimation.
Therefore, to more fully capture the annual eﬀects of economic events, I estimate
a panel time-series model of battle deaths using generalized method of moments with
instrumental variables in Table 2. In Table 2 Model 1, variables commonly used to
measure civil war’s onset, along with variables proposed by Lacina (2006) like military
quality and civil war’s duration are estimated. The base model from which we add new
economic variables is Model 2 in Table 2. Population does in fact matter, along with the
number of years a government has sustained peace, GDP growth in the country, civil
war’s duration, and political terror committed by the state.
3.7

Conclusion
By estimating the severity of civil war in a country-year framework, we can

determine short-run eﬀects of unemployment, ﬁnancial crisis, hyperinﬂation, and foreign
aid during a civil war. Unemployment increases the severity of civil war as rebels are
recruited from the pool of unemployed workers. Foreign aid has a negative eﬀect on the
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severity of war and explains the economic impact of outside help. A ﬁnancial crisis
results in relatively fewer battle deaths and hyperinﬂation has a signiﬁcant, positive
eﬀect on battle deaths in civil war - roughly 387 more deaths with hyperinﬂation than
without on average.
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Table 37: Civil war severity
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Table 38: OLS regressions of battle deaths in civil conflicts 1946-2002
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Table 39: IV/GMM regressions of battle deaths in civil conflicts
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Table 40: IV/GMM regressions of battle deaths in civil conflicts
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Table 41: IV/GMM regressions of battle deaths in civil conflicts - alternative
model without economic variables
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Table 42: IV/GMM regressions of battle deaths in civil conflicts - instrumenting
war duration
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